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PATENT CLAIM INTERPRETATION METHODOLOGIES 
AND THEIR CLAIM SCOPE PARADIGMS 
CHRISTOPHER A. COTROPIA* 
ABSTRACT 
The optimal scope of patent protection is an issue with which 
patent system observers have struggled for decades. Various patent 
doctrines have been recognized as tools for creating specific patent 
scopes and, as a result, implementing specific patent theories. One 
area of patent law that has not been addressed in the discussion on 
patent scope and theories is patent claim interpretation. This 
omission is particularly noteworthy because of the substantive role 
patent claims and the interpretation thereof play in the patent 
system, namely the framing of questions of patent infringement and 
validity. 
This Article will explore the not-yet-discussed relationship between 
claim interpretation methodology and patent scope. The discussion 
will focus on how changes in interpretation methodology affect patent 
scope, an aspect of methodologies that the Article identifies as their 
"claim scope paradigm." Introducing the claim scope paradigm 
concept is mainly beneficial for two reasons. First, identifying the 
claim scope paradigm allows different interpretation methodologies 
to be evaluated as to their impact on the substantive function of 
patent claims. A claim scope paradigm criterion represents a 
significant and worthwhile departure from the current standard of 
certainty used by courts and commentators. Second, recognizing 
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claim scope paradigms facilitates the use of claim interpretation 
methodology as a patent policy lever. Interpretation methodologies 
can be highly effective levers, having the ability to inject patent policy 
at the most basic level of the patent process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The optimal scope of patent protection is an issue with which 
patent system observers have struggled for decades. 1 With any 
invention, considerations turn to what aspects of the invention 
deserve to be protected and are therefore patentable.2 Questions 
also arise regarding what products and processes the inventor 
should be able to control with her patent. 3 Both of these areas of 
concern fall under the broader question of appropriate patent scope. 
Patent scope defines the inventor's power over the markets related 
to the patented invention. 4 Different patent theories suggest 
different scopes of protection to either create incentives for the 
inventor to invent5 or to facilitate the invention's commercialization 
and improvement.6 Various patent doctrines have been recognized 
as tools for creating specific patent scopes and, as a result, imple-
menting specific patent theories. 7 
One area of patent law unaddressed in the discussion on patent 
scope and theories is patent claim interpretation. Patent claims are 
1. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1595-99 (2003) (discussing the divergent theories of the optimal patent scope); Robert P. 
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economies of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
839, 839-40 & n.2 (1990) (noting some of the scholarly work on patent scope). 
2. See Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The "Dubious 
Preponderance,"19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 937 (2004) ("It is a mistake to suggest changes 
to patent validity doctrines without accounting for the interconnections between validity and 
other doctrines, such as patent scope, especially in light of the fact that the law of patent 
scope has been particularly volatile in the past decade."). 
3. See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent 
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1045 (2003) ("Resolving the infringement question 
also requires looking at patent scope.j. 
4. See id.; see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 839-40. 
5. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1604-10 (describing the competitive innovation 
and the cumulative innovation theories, two ex ante theories of patent law); Mark A. Lemley, 
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129-31 
(2004) (describing the classical ex ante theory of patent law). 
6. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 266 (1977) (describing the prospect theory of patent law, an ex post patent theory); 
Lemley, supra note 5, at 131-35 (explaining the ex post theories of patent law). 
7. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1638-68 (cataloging different patent doctrines 
that are either currently used, or could potentially be used, to implement particular patent 
theories). 
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single sentences found at the end of the patent document.8 They are 
statutorily charged with the task of defining the patented 
invention.9 In a vacuum, claim terms are of little use. They must be 
interpreted and given meaning so they can be used in a given 
context. 
The current focus regarding claim interpretation is on which 
interpretation method should be used. 10 The question of proper 
interpretation methodology has been at the forefront since the 
Supreme Court held in Markman u. Westview Instruments, Inc. that 
claim interpretation, also known as claim construction, is a matter 
exclusively for the courts.11 Since this decision, the Federal Circuit, 
the court with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases, 12 
has consistently spoken on the methodology question. The discus-
sions on proper interpretation methodology developed problemati-
cally into two distinct methodologies. 13 Recognizing this fact, the 
Federal Circuit recently issued an en bane opinion in Phillips u. 
A WH Corp. (Phillips III) choosing one of these methodologies.14 
Heretofore, courts and commentators have not viewed this choice 
between methodologies as a question involving patent scope. To the 
contrary, claim interpretation methodology has been seen as only 
effectuating the public notice function of patent claims. 15 That is, 
claims are interpreted only to inform patent observers about the 
8. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (''The specification shall conclude with one or more claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention."). 
9. Id. 
10. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1125-26, 1129-36, 
1171-72 (2004) (detailing the current trends in claim interpretation methodology). 
11. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-91 (1996). 
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000). 
13. See James R. Barney, In Search of"Ordinary Meaning," 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
Soc'y 101, 105-06 (2003) (detailing two distinct claim interpretation methodologies: the 
"holistic approach" and the "procedural approach"); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, 
at 1133-36 (same). 
14. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips III), Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, 
at *13-15 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane) (adopting the methodology that relies heavily on 
the specification over the methodology that focuses greatly on dictionaries). 
15. See John M. Romary & Arie M. Michelsohn, Patent Claim Interpretation After 
Markman: How the Federal Circuit Interprets Claims, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1887, 1890-91 (1997) 
(noting how the Federal Circuit focuses on the concept of public notice in questions regarding 
claim interpretation methodology). 
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patented invention, but nothing more. To meet this goal, methodolo-
gies that produce certain, reproducible, and definitional results 
should be adopted. Claim interpretation methodologies are thus 
evaluated under a certainty criterion. 
The Federal Circuit's en bane order in Phillips u. AWH Corp. 
(Phillips II) makes certainty the only evaluation criterion, asking 
which methodology ''better serve[s]" the "public notice function of 
patent claims."16 The Federal Circuit's en bane opinion in Phillips 
III continues to recognize certainty as a goal. 17 This narrow focus on 
certainty has overlooked claim interpretation methodology's impact 
on the other, more important, function of patent claims- substan-
tively defining patent scope. A choice among interpretation method-
ologies is also a choice among possible patent scopes. Different 
approaches to claim interpretation result in different claim defini-
tions, which in turn create different patent scopes because the 
defined claim establishes the protection afforded the inventor. 
For example, consider the Federal Circuit's recent decision in 
Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems, Inc. 18 In Microsoft, Multi-
Tech charged Microsoft with infringing its patents covering the 
simultaneous transmission of voice and computer data. 19 The 
dispute came down to whether Multi-Tech's patents covered 
Microsoft's transmission of voice and data through a packet-
switched network, such as the Internet, or if the patent covered 
only simultaneous transmission through direct point-to-point 
telephone line connections.20 The Federal Circuit framed this 
question as one of patent claim interpretation, asking whether the 
patents' claim terms "sending," "transmitting," and "receiving'' were 
limited to communication over a direct telephone connection. 21 If so, 
Microsoft's technology did not fall within the claims' scope of 
exclusivity and therefore did not infringe. 22 
16. Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips 11), 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane). 
17. See Phillips III, 2005 WL 1620331, at *10, *15. The opinion does, however, include 
some recognition of the relationship between interpretation methodology and claim scope. See 
id. at *14, *16. The extent of this recognition is discussed in Part IV of this Article. 
18. 357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
19. Id. at 1342-44. 
20. Id. at 1344-45. 
21. Id. at 1346; see also id. at 1354-55 (Rader, J., dissenting) (framing the dispute the 
same way). 
22. Id. at 1344-45. 
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The court's panel could not agree on a result. The source of their 
disagreement was the proper method of interpreting Multi-Tech's 
patent claims. The majority interpreted the claims by relying, for 
the most part, on the patents' specifications.23 They focused on 
statements in the patents describing the invention as a "personal 
communications system [that] includes 'hardware to enable voice, 
fax and data communications with a remote site connected through 
a standard telephone line .... "'24 As a result of consulting the 
specification, the majority limited the claim terms at issue to 
communication over a telephone line and found that Microsoft did 
not infringe. In contrast, the dissent focused on the ordinary 
meaning of the terms "sending," "receiving," and "transmitting," and 
concluded that their plain meaning did not limit communication to 
a particular network.25 The dissent, therefore, found that Multi-
Tech's patents covered the disputed products. 
Although framed as merely a question of proper interpretation 
methodology, the Microsoft decision is also about proper patent 
scope. By adopting the specification-centric methodology, the 
majority de facto concluded that Multi-Tech should not have 
exclusivity beyond the details of the invention described in its 
patent. The dissent, in contrast, employed a methodology that 
allowed Multi-Tech to enjoy a broader patent scope. The type of 
products Multi-Tech could exclude therefore depended on the chosen 
methodology. The linkage between methodology and patent scope 
exhibited in Microsoft holds true in most cases centered on claim 
interpretation. 
This Article will explore the relationship between claim interpre-
tation methodology and patent scope. Although the Federal Circuit's 
recent opinion in Phillips III has started this discussion, it has yet 
to be developed fully. 26 Interpretation methodologies differ in the 
informational sources they reference and the degrees of influence 
they afford each informational source during interpretation. These 
23. I d. at 134 7-49. A patent's specification must contain a description of the invention and 
instructions on how to make and use it. 35 U.S. C. § 112 (2000). 
24. Microsoft, 357 F.3d at 1348 (quoting and citing portions of the patents at issue). 
25. Id. at 1354-55 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
26. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286,2005 WL 1620331, at 
*14, *16 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane) (mentioning a relationship between the two 
methodologies and the resulting claim scope). 
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differences usually result in different meanings for the claim terms 
at issue. Core patent inquiries then use the defined claim to 
determine whether a product or process infringes the patent or 
whether the patent is invalid in light of preexisting art.27 Through 
these steps, methodology changes can impact the elements of patent 
scope by determining what a patentee can and cannot exclude or 
whether a patent is enforceable. As the particulars of claim 
interpretation change, so do the resulting patent scope's characteris-
tics. 
This Article defines how a methodology affects patent scope as 
that methodology's "claim scope paradigm." Encoded in each inter-
pretation method is a unique claim scope paradigm that reflects a 
view on the proper scope of protection that an invention should be 
afforded. A methodology may favor a narrow patent scope, such as 
the majority's approach in Microsoft. On the other hand, a method-
ology may have a claim scope paradigm that produces broad patent 
protection, such as the dissent's methodology in Microsoft. Notably, 
the specifics of the methodology employed, and not the claim 
language at issue, produce variation in scope between methodolo-
gies. In short, the methodology's claim scope paradigm determines 
the patent scope. 
Many benefits exist in recognizing a claim interpretation meth-
odology's claim scope paradigm. First, identifying the claim scope 
paradigm allows different interpretation methodologies to be 
evaluated for their impact on the substantive function of patent 
claims. Evaluation of claim interpretation methodologies is a 
pressing topic, particularly in light of the Federal Circuit's recent en 
bane decision in Phillips III that selected between competing 
methodologies. As opposed to certainty, claim scope paradigm is 
a criterion through which courts and commentators can judge 
27. See TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 1139 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Our validity analysis is a two-step procedure: 'The first step involves the 
proper interpretation of the claims. The second step involves determining whether the 
limitations of the claims as properly interpreted are met by the prior art."') (quoting 
Beachcombers, Int'l, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 
1994)); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane) ("An 
infringement analysis involves two steps. First, the court determines the scope and meaning 
of the patent claims asserted, and then the properly construed claims are compared to the 
allegedly infringing device.") (citations omitted). 
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methodologies by their effect on the substantive, patent scope-
defining function of patent claims. By identifying and examining the 
claim scope paradigm, the substantive implications of a methodol-
ogy's adoption become transparent. Patent observers can then judge 
whether a methodology's claim scope paradigm produces a patent 
scope they consider favorable and in line with patent policy. Such a 
criterion can prove particularly useful if the Supreme Court or 
Congress decides to examine the Federal Circuit's recent decision in 
Phillips III. 
Second, recognizing claim scope paradigms also facilitates the use 
of claim interpretation methodology as a patent policy lever. Patent 
policy levers are patent doctrines that can be adjusted to implement 
particular patent policies or patent theories. Claim interpretation 
methodology has yet to be considered a policy lever, but it possesses 
all of the necessary attributes. Courts have wide discretion in 
crafting claim interpretation methodology, and methodology directly 
affects patent scope by way of its claim scope paradigm. As such, 
how claims are interpreted can be a vehicle for implementing patent 
policy. In fact, interpretation methodology can be a highly effective 
policy lever. Claim interpretation plays a role in all patent decisions, 
and when involved in an issue, its involvement occurs at the ground 
level by shaping the interpretation of the patent claim that will then 
be subject to comparison to an accused device or the prior art. In 
almost every case and on almost every issue, interpretation 
methodology has the ability to consistently interject patent policy or 
theory. 
This Article will introduce the concept of a claim interpretation 
methodology's "claim scope paradigm" and examine its potential 
benefits. The Article will proceed as follows. Part I will explore the 
two related rationales for the modern patent claim: the public notice 
function and the substantive function of defining literal patent 
scope. The patent claim communicates to the world the contours of 
the patented invention and, more importantly, actually defines the 
scope of patent exclusivity. Part II will introduce the concept of 
claim interpretation. The basics of claim interpretation will be 
discussed, including both the informational sources usually used 
during claim construction and the canons of interpretation that 
govern the usage of these sources. Part II will then detail the 
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common disagreement among claim interpretation methodologies: 
the patent specification's proper use during interpretation. Two 
canons govern the specifications: one asking that claims be read in 
light of the specification, and the other asking that limitations not 
be read into the claims from the specification. The tension between 
these two doctrines requires methodologies to choose sides, favoring 
one canon over the other. Part II explores the two most recently 
utilized methodologies, namely the "specification methodology" and 
the ''heavy presumption methodology." These are the two methodol-
ogies examined by the Federal Circuit in Phillips III. This Part 
looks at the two methodologies' different views on how the specifica-
tion should influence the resulting claim definition. Whereas the 
"specification methodology'' fully examines the specification early in 
the interpretation process, the ''heavy presumption methodology'' 
employs a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of 
claim terms, and consequently allows the specification to influence 
the claim's definition in limited circumstances. Part II will also 
discuss the Phillips III decision, in which the Federal Circuit, sitting 
en bane, adopted the specification methodology. 
Part III discusses the evaluation of claim interpretation method-
ologies. Part III first discusses the need for evaluation and particu-
larly evaluation criteria. Evaluation criteria allow for rational choice 
between different methodologies and, more importantly, introduce 
normative reasons-values-:-into the evaluation process. By 
selecting particular criteria, evaluators disclose certain goals or 
values they would like the interpretation methodology to further. 
Part III discusses the certainty criterion currently used in evaluat-
ing claim interpretation methodologies. Courts and commentators 
have both focused almost solely on certainty as the only standard to 
judge methodologies. However, Part III notes some shortcomings of 
the certainty criterion, the most significant of which is that it 
ignores a methodology's influence on the most important function of 
patent claims-substantively defining the patent scope. 
Part IV focuses on a new criterion: claim scope paradigm. Part IV 
first explains the concept of a methodology's claim scope paradigm. 
The two most recent methodologies are then examined to determine 
their specific claim scope paradigms. Part IV finds that the specifi-
cation methodology's claim scope paradigm limits the resulting 
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claim scope to the full invention disclosed in the specification. In 
contrast, the heavy presumption methodology includes a paradigm 
that only loosely links the claim scope with the specification's 
teachings regarding the invention. Part IV then proceeds to discuss 
how methodologies can be evaluated under this criterion. The 
evaluator selects the particular patent policy or theory they would 
like to further and then judges methodologies based on whether 
their claim scope paradigms would further this preferred policy or 
theory. Part IV gives examples using the two recent methodologies 
and finds that the specification methodology would score well with 
an evaluator looking to further the competitive innovation theory of 
patent law. The specification methodology's claim scope paradigm 
produces a patent scope tied closely to the patentee's actual 
inventive activities, giving the patentee far from monopoly power. 
In contrast, the heavy presumption methodology does not fare well 
under any patent policy or theory because its claim scope paradigm 
fails to tune patent scope to the patentee's invention. 
Finally, Part IV concludes by discussing the advantages of using 
claim scope paradigm as an evaluation criterion. Part IV first 
discusses how using the claim scope paradigm gives evaluators the 
ability to address the substantive function of patent claims. 
Identifying a methodology's claim scope paradigm allows evaluators 
to select methodologies that fit their preferred patent theory. Part 
IV also notes that the claim scope paradigm exposes the existing 
normative backdrop to methodology selection, that is, choosing a 
methodology means choosing a patent scope. The second advantage 
discussed in Part IV is that methodology is facilitated as a policy 
lever. Once the claim scope paradigm is recognized, one can discern 
the particular impact that a methodology will have on patent scope. 
With this information, courts can use methodology to ensure that 
claim definition comports with patent policy, and if patent policy 
needs to be changed, courts can select a methodology that effectu-
ates that change. 
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I. FuNCTIONS OF PATENT CLAIMS 
A modern U.S. patent consists of two basic parts: a specification 
and one or more claims.28 The specification includes textual 
descriptions and drawings containing information regarding the 
patented invention.29 This information describes the patented 
invention and informs those skilled in the relevant technology how 
to implement the invention. 30 A patent ends with one or more patent 
claims, 31 which consist of a single sentence describing what the 
patentee32 defines as the patented invention.33 The claim must 
"particularly pointO out and distinctly claimO the subject matter 
which the applicant regards as his invention."34 Law requires both 
the specification and at least one patent claim.35 Once issued, the 
patent, containing the specification and one or more patent claims, 
becomes publicly available.36 
28. 35 u.s.c. § 112 (2000). 
29. See id. The specification is also referred to as the "written description," because 
technically the specification includes the patent claims. See id. (requiring that "[t]he 
specification shall conclude with one or more claims"). For purposes of this Article, the term 
"specification" will be used to refer to all parts of the patent document other than the claims. 
30. Id.; Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (describing the contents of a patent's specification). 
31. 35 u.s.c. § 112 (2000). 
32. The term "patentee" is used to refer to the inventor whose patent is issued. The patent 
may be assigned to others, who are then considered the patent owner or patent holder. See 
35 u.s.c. § 261 (2000). 
33. 35 U.S. C. § 112 (2000); see White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886) (''The claim is a 
statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define 
precisely what his invention is .... "). 
Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 6, 725,809 provides a good example of a patent claim. It reads: 
"An edible flying retrievable animal toy, comprising: a circular body member having a convex 
upper surface and a concave lower surface wherein the body member is formed of rawhide." 
The patent is directed towards a flying retrievable animal toy that is also edible. As can be 
seen from claim 1, the claim requires the toy to be circular, have a convex upper surface and 
concave lower surface, and be made of rawhide. The claim's upper and lower surface 
limitations presumably make the claimed flying disc's shape similar to a Frisbee. U.S. Patent 
No. 6, 725,809 (flied Feb. 26, 2003) (issued Apr. 27, 2004). 
34. 35 u.s.c. § 112 (2000). 
35. Id. 
36. See id. § 122(b). Patents are available for public viewing and searching through the 
USPTO's website. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov. Unless the 
applicant selects otherwise, patent applications are published no later than eighteen months 
after their filing. 35 U.S. C. § 122(b)(1) (2000). 
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The patent claim plays two major roles in patent law. First, the 
claim performs a notice function by acting as the vehicle through 
which the patentee tells the world what the patentee wishes the 
patent to protect.37 The claim seeks to inform the public of the exact 
scope of exclusivity granted by the patent.38 The claim's notifying 
function is effectuated by the claim's predefined and public location 
at the end of the universally available issued patent. The patent 
claim also performs a substantive function that goes beyond the 
claim's public availability. The claim legally defines the patent's 
scope of protection.39 The claim's meaning delineates the subject 
matter that only the patentee may practice.40 Thus, a patent claim 
performs both "definitional and public-notice functions."41 The 
following subparts explore these two functions in detail. 
A. Public Notice Function 
A patent claim seeks to inform the public of the subject matter 
over which the patent provides exclusivity.42 Law requires every 
37. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(discussing the public nature of the patent document and the patent claims). 
38. See id.; see also Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (noting how "the public is placed on notice" by patent claims). 
39. See Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961) 
("[T]he claims made in the patent are the sole measure of the grant .... "). The scope of 
exclusivity the patent grants to the patentee is also referred to as the "claim scope" or the 
"patent scope" of the patent. Claims define the literal patent scope. This scope is 
supplemented currently by the doctrine of equivalents. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731-32 (2002) (''The scope of a patent is not limited 
to its literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims described." (citing 
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 347 (1854))). For purposes of this Article, the 
claim scope and patent scope being referenced is the literal scope of protection because claim 
interpretation directly affects only literal scope. Cf. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 
833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en bane) (articulating the "all elements" rule that prevents a 
finding of infringement if every element of a claim or its equivalent is not found in the accused 
device). 
40. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) ("'The rights of the plaintiff depend 
upon the claim in his patent, according to its proper construction .... "' (quoting Masury v. 
Anderson, 16 F. Cas. 1087, 1088 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873))). 
41. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). 
42. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996) ("It has long been 
understood that a patent must describe the exact scope of an invention and its manufacture 
to 'secure to [the patentee] all to which he is entitled, [and] to apprise the public of what is 
still open to them."' (alterations in original) (quoting McClain, 141 U.S. at 424)), aff'd, 517 
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patent to have claims, and the claims' preset location at the end of 
the specification is statutorily defined.43 Law also requires the 
patentee to "particularly pointD out" the subject matter over which 
the patentee wishes to protect in the claim. 44 Once the patent issues, 
the patent claim becomes publicly available.45 All of these aspects 
work together so the claim performs its public notice function by 
notifying the public of the protected invention. 
The claim finds its roots in the need for an instrument to notify 
the public about the patent's scope of protection. The patent claim 
is relatively new when compared to the existence of the U.S. patent 
system. 46 The early patent statutes of 1790 and 1793 did not 
explicitly require a claim.47 Before the modern patent claim, courts 
defined the scope of patent rights by discerning the "principle" or 
"essence" of the invention from the specification's technical descrip-
tion.48 Any understanding of the full scope of the patentee's 
protected invention was taken from the drawings and description in 
the patent's specification. This inquiry was recognized as "often a 
point of intrinsic dufficulty [sic]."49 Courts and juries encountered 
difficultly in discerning exactly what was protected when they 
looked only to the specification without any additional guidance. 50 
Specifications can be quite long and may contain material that is 
irrelevant to defining the patent's scope. Under the specification-
only system, both the patentee and the public were unable to 
determine with any certainty the specific contours of the invention 
the patent protected. 51 
The Patent Act of 1870 introduced specific claiming require-
ments, indicating that the patentee needed to claim the invention 
u.s. 370 (1996). 
43. 35 u.s. c. § 112 (2000). 
44. Id. 
45. See id. § 122(b). 
46. William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. 
L. REV. 755, 757 (1948); see also Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of the U.S. Patents, 20 
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 134, 134-4 7 (1938) (discussing the history of patent claims). 
47. Woodward, supra note 46, at 758; see also Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 
(repealed 1836); Act of Apr. 2, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793). 
48. See Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432). 
49. Id. 
50. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar 
of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 309-10 (2002). 
51. See id. 
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distinctly and with particularity. 52 The 1870Actpromptedpatentees 
to draft patent claims, in addition to the information already in the 
specification. More specifically, the Act caused patentees to engage 
in "peripheral claiming,"53 which involves using claims to '"markO 
out the periphery or boundary of the area covered by the claim."'54 
The patent claim affords the patentee the opportunity to recite the 
specific metes and bounds of the patented invention to the patent's 
reader. 55 This use of the claim is meant to reduce the confusion over 
what aspects of the invention the patentee seeks to protect.56 
Accordingly, the claim provides public notice of what the patent 
protects. 
The public notice function of patent claims now stands at the 
"forefront of patent law jurisprudence."57 Both the Supreme Court 
and the Federal Circuit have emphasized the role the patent claim 
plays in informing the public of the subject matter a patent 
protects. 58 In fact, the Federal Circuit's first question in the en bane 
order in Phillips II emphasized this purpose of patent claims, asking 
which claim interpretation methodology better serves "the public 
52. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1871). 
53. RIDSDALE ELIJS, PATENT CLAIMS§ 4 (1949). 
54. Hilton Davis Chern. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(Nies, J., dissenting) (quoting ELIJS, supra note 53, at § 4), reu'd 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
55. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) ("This distinct and formal claim is, 
therefore, of primary importance, in the effort to ascertain precisely what it is that is patented 
.... "). 
56. See, e.g., Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American 
Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 501 (1990) ("[T]he function of 
claims is to enable everyone to know, without going through a lawsuit, what infringes the 
patent and what does not."). 
57. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15 (2000) 
(noting that "[t]he importance of the notice function of the patent claim has always been 
appreciated, or at least understood by judges on the Federal Circuit and its predecessor, the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals"). 
58. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1992) 
(noting the "public-notice functionD of the statutory claiming requirement"); Univ. of 
Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that both the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit frequently discuss the public notice function patent 
claims serve by telling the public and the Patent and Trademark Office what the patent 
protects); PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn lnt'l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (identifying the claim's key role in informing the public "which products or processes 
would infringe the patent and which would not"). 
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notice function of patent claims."59 The Phillips III en bane opinion 
reiterated the public notice function of patent claims. 60 
B. Patent Scope Defining Function 
Patent claims perform another function; they actually establish 
the scope of exclusivity afforded to an issued patent.61 That is, 
patent claims define the invention the patent will protect. This 
definitional function is tied to the claim's public notice function. The 
substantive function of a patent claim, however, goes well beyond 
the claim simply being locatable and open to public inspection. The 
claim tells the public the patent's particular scope of exclusivity by 
defining the patent grant's metes and bounds. This is the most 
fundamental trait of the modern patent claim.62 
Through the claim's words, the patent claim establishes the 
primary area of exclusivity the patentee will enjoy because of the 
patent grant. 63 A claim resembles a land description in a deed 
because it defines the exact area protected by the legal instrument.64 
59. Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips II), 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane). 
60. Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, at *4, 
*13-15 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane). 
61. Again, to be complete, the patent claim's literal scope of exclusivity is supplemented 
by the doctrine of equivalents. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 21 ("Under this doctrine, a 
product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim 
may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is 'equivalence' between the elements of the 
accused product or process and the claimed elements ofthe patented invention." (citing Grauer 
Tank & Mfg. Co. u. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950))). The doctrine of 
equivalents gives the patentee exclusivity over activities equivalent to the patent claim's 
literal scope. See id. Under the doctrine of equivalents, the scope of protection is tied to the 
patent claims by the all-elements rule. To find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, 
an equivalent in the accused product for each patent claim element must exist. See id. 
62. ''The economic significance of a patent depends on its scope: the broader the scope, the 
larger the number of competing products and processes that will infringe the patent." Merges 
& Nelson, supra note 1, at 839. 
63. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (noting that 
a claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right that the patent confers on the 
patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention); Zenith 
Labs., Inc. v. Brystol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that the 
claim "sets the metes and bounds of the invention entitled to protection of the patent system"); 
Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(noting that the claim's preamble can influence the resulting scope of protection that the 
entire claim grants). 
64. In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (indicating 
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A patent grants its owner the right to exclude others from making, 
using, offering to sell, or selling the "patented invention."65 Each 
patent claim defines a "patented invention."66 If someone engages in 
the patent holder's exclusive activities, they infringe the patent.67 
Infringement is judged by comparing the allegedly infringing 
activity to the claims' defined area of exclusivity.68 ''Victory in an 
infringement suit requires a finding that the patent claim 'covers 
the alleged infringer's product or process .... "'69 
The patent claim is also referenced when determining a patent's 
validity. 70 The claim defines the invention, 71 and patent law provides 
exclusivity for only those inventions that are useful, novel, and 
unobvious.72 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
evaluates a patent application by examining each of the applica-
that claims are similar to descriptions oflands in deeds because claims provide the metes and 
bounds that define the area protected by the patent). 
The description ofland in a deed, like a patent claim, performs both a public notice function 
and a substantive function. The deed is meant to convey to all the boundaries of the 
landowner's property rights. There is, as with a patent claim, an underlying substantive 
aspect to this definition. The deed establishes, at least in part, the area of land exclusively 
under the landowner's control. This substantive function of the deed goes well beyond mere 
public notification; it establishes the owner's property interests against the world. 
65. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). Section 271(a) also prohibits importing the patented 
invention into the United States. See id. 
66. Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 487 (1935) 
("Under the statute it is the claims of the patent which defme the invention."). Each claim 
defines a separate and distinct invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (noting that each claim 
of a patent is "presumed valid independently"); Gould Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571, 576 
(Ct. Cl. 1978) ("It is also important to keep in mind that each claim of a patent is a separate 
and distinct invention."). 
67. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
68. See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct Cl. 1967) (noting that 
"[c]ourts can neither broaden nor narrow the claims to give the patentee something different 
than what he has set forth"). 
69. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996) (quoting H. 
SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 80 (2d ed. 1995)). 
70. TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 1139 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (noting that the "validity analysis is a two-step procedure: 'The first step involves 
the proper interpretation of the claims. The second step involves determining whether the 
limitations of the claims as properly interpreted are met by the prior art."' (quoting 
Beachcombers, lnt'l, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 
1994))). 
71. Altoona Publix Theatres, 294 U.S. at 487. 
72. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000) (defining patentable inventions and the conditions on 
patentability). 
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tion's patent claims.73 If any particular patent claim defines an 
invention that does not meet the patentability requirements, that 
claim is rejected, is not issued, and cannot be enforced. 74 A patent 
claim's validity can also be evaluated in court after the patent's 
issuance.75 As in proceedings before the USPTO, the court deter-
mines whether the claim's defined subject matter meets the patent-
ability requirements. 76 If the claimed subject matter fails any of 
the protectability requirements, the court invalidates that patent 
claim. 77 In all validity determinations, the claim is the starting point 
of the analysis because it substantively defines what the patentee 
wishes to protect.78 Instead of deciding whether someone infringes 
this area of protection, validity questions look at the claimed subjec.t 
matter and determine whether it is worthy of a limited period of 
exclusivity. 
The patent claim's scope is often dispositive for most patent 
issues.79 Once the subject matter the patent claim identifies is 
defined, infringement and validity questions usually are answered 
easily.8° For questions of infringement, the accused device either 
falls within or outside the claim's defined area of exclusivity.81 For 
73. See In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that the USPTO's 
determination of a patent claim's validity first involves construing the patent claims). 
74. See id.; see also 35 U.S. C. § 131 (2000) (granting the issuance of a patent only after a 
patent application is examined to determine if the applicant is entitled to a patent under the 
law). 
75. 35 u.s.c. § 282 (2000). 
76. See id. 
77. See id. 
78. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
79. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, 
J., concurring) (noting that "to decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the 
case"), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Nard, supra note 57, at 3 & nn.6-7 (listing cases that 
indicate that the claim meaning controls the outcome in patent cases). 
80. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 989. 
81. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1117-18 (noting how claim meaning 
guides the inquiry in questions of infringement). 
Consider the flying, edible, animal toy claim set forth in note 33. The claim required the toy 
to be made of "rawhide." If a competitor decided to make a flying, edible, animal toy that was 
circular and shaped like a Frisbee, but made out of dried pork skin, a question would arise 
as to whether the competitor infringed. The question would center on the meaning of the term 
"rawhide" and whether it encompassed dried pork skins. If "rawhide" includes dried pork 
skins, the competitor infringes and the patent holder can enjoin the infringer from making 
and selling the product. However, if "rawhide" does not include dried pork skins, then the 
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validity questions, the subject matter the patentee seeks to protect 
with the claim has either been done before or not.82 The patent 
claim, and more importantly its defined area of exclusivity, play a 
central role in the patent system. 83 That is why the substantive 
function of patent claims or in other words defining the area of 
exclusivity is so important. The patent claim's defined area of 
protection dictates what the patentee can exclude and properly 
protect.84 
The patent claim, which is intimately intertwined with infringe-
ment and validity-the two core questions in patent law-sits at the 
core of most patent protection theories.85 All patent theories speak 
to the proper scope of patent protection.86 The breadth of protection 
defines the patent's exclusionary power and how it can affect the 
technological development in the patent's given industry.87 The 
scope of protection also defines the patent's power relative to what 
has already been done, thereby establishing how different an 
invention must be from an earlier accomplishment to warrant 
patent protection.88 Both of these effects of patent protection are 
addressed by patent theories, which opine about how such 
protections should be tailored.89 Patent theory, and related ques-
tions of patent policy, therefore hinge on a patent's scope of 
exclusivity.90 The patent claim defines this scope of exclusivity. 
patentee holds no power over the competitor. The claim defines the scope of exclusivity the 
patentee enjoys, and its meaning usually dictates the outcome of most infringement questions. 
82. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
83. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) ("The franchise which 
the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, using, 
or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee. This is all that he 
obtains by the patent."). 
84. See Nard, supra note 57, at 3. 
85. Theories of patent protection, also referred to as patent theories, are "explanations for 
the role of patents" and statements "as to their optimal division and scope." Burk & Lemley, 
supra note 1, at 1595. 
86. Id. 
87. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 839-40. 
88. See Ted O'Donoghue, A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation, 29 RAND 
J. ECON. 654, 657 (1998). 
89. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1595-615 (summarizing competing patent 
theories). 
90. See id. at 1580. 
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By defining the patent's exclusionary power, the patent claim 
thus performs an important substantive function in patent law. The 
claim is utilized to establish the borders of protection, which in turn 
are referenced to decide whether a competitor can be excluded or a 
patent is worthy of protection. The patent claim's central role in 
these decisions places it at the center of substantive patent deci-
sions and patent theories. 
II. PATENT CLAIM INTERPRETATION METHODOLOGIES 
For a patent claim to perform either of the functions described 
above, a patent claim must be given meaning; it must be inter-
preted.91 Once interpreted, the public is notified fully of the patented 
invention. The claim meaning provides observers with a better 
understanding of the patent. In addition, claim interpretation 
establishes the substantive boundaries of the patent's protection. 
Defining claim terms establishes the edges of the exclusivity 
provided by the patent. 
Courts possess tremendous discretion in how to interpret claims. 
Consequently, different claim interpretation methodologies have 
emerged. This Part will introduce the basics of claim interpretation 
upon which methodologies are based. Both the tools used in inter-
pretation and the canons governing these tools will be discussed. 
A general agreement exists about the universe of information 
sources one can use when interpreting claims. The difference 
between methodologies is usually introduced in the selection of 
various canons governing the use of these information sources. The 
most common variation among interpretation approaches-the use 
of the specification-will be examined. 
This Part will conclude by looking at the two claim interpretation 
methodologies that the Federal Circuit considered in Phillips III. 
The difference between these two methodologies results from 
differing views on the specification's role in claim interpretation. 
These differences expand to include dissimilarities on the relation-
ship between the specification, claims, and extrinsic definitional 
sources, such as dictionaries. Both methodologies are exemplified in 
91. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane). 
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the Federal Circuit's panel decision in Phillips u. AWH Corp. 
(Phillips 1).92 The majority and dissent's disagreement over these 
methodologies in Phillips I forms the basis of the en bane decision 
in Phillips III. 93 
A. Claim Interpretation Basics 
Claim interpretation, also known as claim construction, involves 
defining a claim term or terms to determine the claim's exact 
meaning.94 Once a claim's meaning is determined, the exact location 
of the patent's metes and bounds are known and infringement or 
validity issues can be determined.95 Claim interpretation places the 
claim in context for the particular patent dispute at issue.96 
Interpreting claim terms is the starting point to answering these 
fundamental patent questions.97 Claim interpretation is, therefore, 
the first step in any patent inquiry,98 and in most patent cases it is 
also the stopping point.99 
92. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips I), 363 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 376 
F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane). 
93. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286,2005 WL 1620331, at 
*2-3 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane) (discussing the Phillips I decision's two approaches to 
claim interpretation). The dispute between these two methodologies did not start with the 
Phillips I decision. The dispute can be traced at least as far back as Federal Circuit 
jurisprudence after the Supreme Court's decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 
517 U.S. 370 (1996). See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1111, 1133-34 (discussing 
two distinct methodologies that have emerged since the Supreme Court's decision in 
Markman that differ, at least in part, in how they use specification). The two methodologies 
have, however, crystallized over the course of the last ten years. Id. 
94. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 
U.S. 370 (1996) (stating that the first step in the infringement analysis is "commonly known 
as claim construction or interpretation"). 
95. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996) (''Victory in an 
infringement suit requires a finding that the patent claim 'covers the alleged infringer's 
product or process,' which in turn necessitates a determination of'what the words in the claim 
mean."') (quoting H. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 80 (2d ed. 1995)); McGinley v. 
Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Amazon.com, Inc. v. 
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that claim 
construction is the first step in a validity analysis). 
96. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1119. 
97. Id. (noting that, while still a matter of debate, "it is clear that claim construction plays 
a major-and perhaps the major-role in patent infringement litigation"); Nard, supra note 
57, at 4 (noting that claim interpretation "lies at the heart of our patent system"). 
98. See Cybor Corp. v FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane). 
99. Markman, 52 F.3d at 993 (Mayer, J., concurring). "Where the parties do not dispute 
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Although some basic doctrines exist that govern how claims are 
interpreted, courts currently maintain a wide range of discretion 
when construing patent claims. No statute indicates the exact 
procedure for claim interpretation.100 Moreover, no recognized 
constitutional restraints exist that dictate a particular approach to 
construction.101 Statutory law indicates what must appear in the 
patent document and requires the claims to define the invention, 102 
but does not expressly instruct courts on how to approach defining 
claim terms. This wide room for discretion allows for the develop-
ment of different claim interpretation methodologies. 103 
Any patent claim interpretation methodology consists of two basic 
parts. The first entails defining a group of eligible interpretative 
sources. 104 The universe of interpretative sources identifies which 
materials one may look to when determining a claim's meaning. The 
second aspect of any interpretation methodology consists of using a 
set of canons of interpretation. 105 These canons govern how the 
interpretative sources are used to determine a claim term's 
any relevant facts regarding the accused product ... but disagree over possible claim 
interpretations, the question of literal infringement collapses into claim construction and is 
amenable to summary judgment." Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 983 
(Fed. Cir. 1997). Parties commonly stipulate to the outcome of issues of infringement or 
validity once a court issues its claim interpretation. See Rousey Pharms., Inc. v. Astrazeneca 
UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (indicating that the patentee stipulated that 
if the district court's construction "were not reversed or modified on appeal, its patents would 
be invalid and not infringed"). In fact, a court's claim construction often prompts settlement 
in patent cases. Patent Litig. Comm. of the Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n, The 
Interpretation of Patent Claims, 32 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Assoc. Q.J. 1, 5 (2004) ("Given the 
great impact claim construction may have on the outcome of a case, the court's construction 
of the claims of a patent may be case dispositive or drastically affect the prospect of 
settlement."). 
100. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (stating that a single patent claim is required, but not 
indicating how that claim should be interpreted). 
101. But see Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Law, in A MATI'ER OF 
INTERPRETATION 3, 9-13, 34-35 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that the Constitution's 
separation of powers requires a specific method of statutory interpretation). 
102. See 35 U.S. C. § 112 (2000). 
103. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips II]), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286,2005 WL 1620331, at 
*4 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (noting that 35 U.S. C. § 112 requires the specification and claims 
be related, but does not answer "the extent to which we should resort to and rely on a patent's 
specification in seeking to ascertain the proper scope of its claims"). 
104. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 216-20 (3d ed. 2003) (detailing the commonly used interpretative sources in patent cases). 
105. See id. at 220-22 (describing four major canons of patent claim interpretation). 
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meaning. 106 The universe of interpretative sources that courts use 
to interpret claims is well defined and fairly uncontroversial. 107 The 
canons that govern these interpretative sources, in contrast, form 
the foundation for the differences between most approaches. 
1. Interpretative Sources 
The interpretative sources utilized in claim interpretation fall 
into two general categories. The first category includes three sources 
identified as "intrinsic evidence."108 These three sources constitute 
intrinsic evidence because they are publicly available and unique to 
the patent under construction.109 In other words, they comprise part 
of the patent being interpreted.110 
The claim language is intrinsic evidence.111 The claim's words 
seek to define the patented invention's scope.112 Because the claim 
is what is being interpreted, the language contained therein should 
play a role in its own interpretation.113 The specification accom-
panying the claim being interpreted is also an intrinsic interpreta-
tive source114 because, by definition, it is contained in the same 
public patent as the claims and must describe the claimed inven-
tion.115 Thus, the specification is eligible as a source from which one 
can discern a claim's meaning. 116 The third and final piece of 
intrinsic evidence is the patent's prosecution history. 117 The 
prosecution history is a record of all proceedings before the USPTO 
regarding the patent. 118 This history is publicly available and 
106. See id. at 216. 
107. But see John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The 
Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183 (1999) 
(arguing that prosecution history should not be referenced during claim construction). 
108. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
109. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
110. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. 
111. Id.; see also Bell Commc'ns Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc'ns Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 
620 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
112. 35 u.s.c. § 112 (2000). 
113. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. 
114. Id.; Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397-98 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
115. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 397-98. 
116. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
117. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582-83. 
118. Id. 
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includes correspondence between the USPTO and the patentee 
regarding the patent's examination prior to being issued.119 The 
prosecution history may contain the patentee's representations 
regarding the scope of the patent's claims.120 
"Extrinsic evidence" encompasses sources falling outside the 
patent's public record. 121 For example, extrinsic evidence includes 
expert and inventor testimony, scientific articles, technical treatises, 
and dictionaries. 122 These sources may be relevant to claim terms or 
the patent's field of technology123 but they are not specific to the 
patent and thus cannot be deemed intrinsic. 124 
2. Canons of Interpretation 
The canons of interpretation govern how one uses the sources 
identified above to define claim terms. 125 Typical canons explain 
how an interpretative source is used to determine a claim term's 
meaning. For example, the canon of claim differentiation instructs 
courts to compare claims in the same patent to ensure that the 
meaning of one claim does not render another claim and its 
meaning redundant. 126 Claim differentiation identifies an interpre-
tative source-the patent claims-and instructs one how to use it to 
arrive at a claim meaning, namely by interpreting two claims to 
have different meanings. 
Other canons speak to the interrelationship between the different 
interpretative sources. Canons will establish a hierarchy among 
interpretative sources, indicating which source should be considered 
first when construing claims and whether the meaning gleaned from 
one source should trump the suggested meaning from another. For 
example, one canon instructs the construer to refer to intrinsic 
evidence before looking at extrinsic evidence, thereby favoring the 
119. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1966). 
120. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582-83. 
121. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
122. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. 
123. Id. 
124. See id. 
125. MERGES ET AL., supra note 104, at 216. 
126. See Ecolab, Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This canon 
is usually employed as a presumption that "each claim in a patent is presumptively different 
in scope." Intermatic Inc. v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 273 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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former over the latter. 127 The canon also provides that extrinsic 
evidence can only be used to define claim terms when a claim's 
meaning remains ambiguous after consulting all three forms of 
intrinsic evidence.128 This interpretation canon establishes a 
definite hierarchy, placing intrinsic evidence before extrinsic 
evidence in sequence of reference and expressly limiting when 
extrinsic evidence can influence the ultimate claim definition. 129 
Some canons have exceptions and methodologies may vary based 
on their observance or nonobservance of these exceptions.130 
B. Common Variation Among Methodologies: The Degree of Influ-
ence of the Specification 
One of the most common variations between methodologies is 
how they use the specification when interpreting claim language. 
Specifically, this variation involves the degree of influence that 
information in the specification can have on the resulting interpre-
tation. Some methodologies ensure that the specification is refer-
enced, and its teachings used to influence, a claim term's definition 
in every interpretation. In other methodologies, the specification is 
referred to in limited circumstances and, in turn, its teachings will 
rarely inform the resulting construction. This variation stems from 
two often cited and conflicting interpretation canons: the canon to 
read the claims in light of the specification, and the canon prohibit-
ing reading limitations from the specification into the claims. These 
two canons, the tension between them, and the resulting common 
127. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583-84. 
128. Id.; see also Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1562 
(Fed. Cir. 1990). 
129. See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("In 
construing the claims we look to the language of the claims, the specification, and the 
prosecution history. Extrinsic evidence may also be considered, if needed to assist in 
determining the meaning or scope of technical terms in the claims.") (citations omitted). 
130. For example, some methodologies, while abiding by the canon favoring intrinsic 
evidence, will still refer to dictionaries, an extrinsic source, before referencing intrinsic 
evidence. See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(discussing how dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises should be consulted initially when 
interpreting claims, even though a prohibition exists against referring to extrinsic evidence 
so early in the interpretation process); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 
1298, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that courts can examine extrinsic evidence, even 
when the patent is unambiguous, to understand the underlying technology). 
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variation among methodologies will be explored below. However, 
before this discussion, a brief understanding of the specification's 
contents is necessary. 
1. Patent Specification 
A patent specification includes three basic elements: a written 
description, an enabling description, and the best mode. 131 All 
three elements focus on the invention and, in particular, the 
invention recited in the patent claims. 132 The invention that the 
specification must describe and enable is the invention that the 
patent claims define. 133 Through the written description require-
ment, the specification must include a reasonably detailed textual 
description of the claimed invention.134 The enablement requirement 
asks the inventor to set forth a working embodiment of the claimed 
invention in the specification.135 
The written description element requires the patentee to describe 
the invention in sufficient detail to convey with reasonable clarity 
to a person skilled in the art that the patentee was in possession of 
the invention on the patent's filing date. 136 The specification must 
131. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). This Article's discussion regarding the specification 
requirements will focus on only the written description and enablement requirements. 
132. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen·Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting 
that the patent specification must "describe the claimed invention so that one skilled in the 
art can recognize what is clainled"). 
133. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Enzo 
Biochem, 323 F.3d at 968; In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Hyatt, 708 
F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[T]he enabling disclosure of the specification [must] be 
commensurate in scope with the claim under consideration."). 
134. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
Currently, much debate exists about whether there is a written description requirement 
distinct from the enablement requirement. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 
F.3d 1303, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing 
en bane); see also Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the "Written 
Description" Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL 'y 55, 61·69 (2000) (arguing that "the distinction between the written description and 
enablement requirements is artificial"). 
135. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 
1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
136. 35 U.S. C.§ 112 (2000); Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1320-
21 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991); 
Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Kaslow, 707 
F.2d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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include enough information, through text and/or drawings, to 
show a skilled artisan that the patentee knew of the patented 
invention when the patent's application was filed with the 
USPT0.137 Therefore, the specification must describe the universe 
of inventions the patentee may decide to claim. 138 The description 
requirement prevents the patentee from patenting something the 
patentee has not demonstrated to the public as having been 
invented by the patent's filing date.139 
The enablement element, in contrast, requires the specification 
to disclose "the manner and process of making and using [the 
invention], in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable 
any person skilled in the art to which [the invention] pertains, 
or with which [the invention] is most nearly connected, to make 
and use the same .... "140 The specification must provide the public 
with enough information to enable the practice of the claimed 
invention.141 Although the specification need not disclose every 
possible embodiment of the claimed invention, it must provide 
enough detail to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to 
practice the full breadth of the patent's claims.142 The teachings can 
require some experimentation on the skilled artisan's part, as long 
as "undue experimentation" is not required. 143 
137. See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561; see also Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 
1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that the written description requirement may be satisfied with 
"words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc."). 
138. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1560-62. The written description requirement was meant 
initially to ensure that the specification defined the patented invention. Evans v. Eaton, 20 
U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 430-33 (1822). Patent claims have since taken over this task. See supra 
notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
139. See Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that the 
requirement "guards against the inventor's overreaching" by having the specification describe 
the full breadth of her "original creation" at the time of filing); see also In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 
1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Although [the patentee] does not have to describe exactly the 
subject matter claimed, the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art 
to recognize that [the patentee] invented what is claimed.") (citation omitted). 
140. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000}. The specification must also include the best mode of practicing 
the patented invention the inventor contemplated at the patent's filing. I d.; Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001}. 
141. Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
142. See id.; AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Wright, 
999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
143. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561; In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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The enablement requirement, like the written description 
requirement, forces the patentee to provide details about the 
invention the patentee wishes to claim. To be enabling, the specifi-
cation must include technical information, and possibly drawings, 
showing how a skilled artisan can actually implement the claimed 
invention.144 The specification may include a list of materials used 
to make the invention, instructions on how to operate the invention, 
or details on the environments in which the invention should 
work. The specification usually includes specific working examples 
of the invention termed "embodiments" of the invention.145 The 
enablement requirement creates a specification that teaches its 
intended audience-those skilled in the relevant art-how to 
actually practice the claimed invention. 
Because of these two requirements, a patent's specification is 
required to contain information about the patentee's invention. 
The specification must describe the invention, pursuant to the 
written description requirement, and enable its use, pursuant to 
the enablement requirement. These requirements ensure that the 
specification is rich with invention-specific information, containing 
a textual description of the patentee's invention and enough 
technical information to enable the use of the patentee's invention. 
Notably, a specification's teachings do not end with the spec-
ification's text and drawings. The specification is written to a 
particular audience, namely a person having ordinary skill in the 
art. 146 This individual brings knowledge and skill to bear on the 
specification's teachings147 and thus a description of one way to 
implement the invention may disclose a multitude of variations to 
a skilled artisan. 148 For example, the specification need not teach 
144. CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
145. Although most patents include working examples to enable the patented invention, 
such examples are not explicitly required. See In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 908 (C. C.P.A. 
1970). 
146. See Kevin S. Rhoades, The Section 112 "Description Requirement"-A Misbegotten 
Provision Confirmed, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'¥ 869, 893-94 (1992) (noting that 
those skilled in the art are "the specification's audience"). 
147. See Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(noting that "[a] patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art"); 
Scott R. Boalick, Patent Quality and the Dedication Rule, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 215, 228-29 
(2004). 
148. See In re Howarth, 654 F.2d 103, 105 (C. C.P.A. 1981) ("An inventor need not, however, 
explain every detail since he is speaking to those skilled in the art."). 
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how to make or use something as well-known as a bolt for fastening 
two items together, but the specification also need not teach those 
substitutes for a bolt that are well known in the art, such as a nail 
or screw.149 The extent of the specification's teachings go beyond its 
literal contents, expanded by the knowledge and skill of the specifica-
tion's intended audience, a person with ordinary skill in the relevant 
art.Iso 
Figure 1, below, depicts the specification's teachings. Notably, the 
''literal patent specification," that is, what the specification exactly 
says and shows, is supplemented with the skill in the art as of the 
patent's filing date. 151 This additional knowledge expands the 
specification's teachings about the invention, creating what will be 
termed the "constructive patent specification." This constructive 
specification embodies the full extent of the specification's teachings 
about the invention and is labeled the "disclosed invention." 
149. The disclosure requirements 
permitO resort to material outside of the specification in order to satisfy the 
enablement portion of the statute because it makes no sense to encumber the 
specification of a patent with all the knowledge of the past concerning how to 
make and use the claimed invention. One skilled in the art knows how to make 
and use a bolt, a wheel, a gear, a transistor, or a known chemical starting 
material. The specification would be of enormous and unnecessary length if one 
had to literally reinvent and describe the wheel. 
Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc. 198 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
150. 
That is not to say that the specification itself must necessarily describe how to 
make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention, for the artisan's 
knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, 
interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the 
disclosed embodiments, depending upon the predictability of the art. 
AK Steel Corp. v. Sallac, 344 F.3d 1234-44 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 
774 (C. C.P.A. 1962) (noting the appreciation by one skilled in the art of aspects in the not 
explicitly disclosed specification). 
151. See In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 530 (C. C.P.A. 1981) (noting that the specification 
teachings are frozen as of the patent's filing date). Although not visually depicted in Figure 
1, the specification's literal teachings are also supplemented with experimentation by the 
skilled artisan that is not undue. See AK Steel, 344 F.3d at 1244. 










2. Use of the Specification in Claim Interpretation 
~Skillin 
the Art 
The specification is considered intrinsic evidence and a well-
recognized information source for claim interpretation. However, 
the specification's exact usage in the construction of patent claims 
is not as clear. In fact, the specification's different uses in claim 
construction can conflict with one another, forcing a methodology to 
choose one use over the other. 
Two often cited interpretation canons illustrate the friction 
surrounding the specification's use in construing claims.152 One 
canon notes that claim language is "read in light of the specifica-
tion" during construction.153 A claim's meaning should be informed 
by the information contained in the accompanying specification. The 
152. Others have noted the tension between these two canons. See Romary & Michelsohn, 
supra note 15, at 1897-926; Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1133. 
153. Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
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rationale behind this canon finds its roots in the statutory linkage 
between the specification's contents and the claimed invention.154 
The patent is an "integrated document," with the specification 
further describing the subject matter that the claims recite. 155 As 
such, the specification describes the claimed invention and can place 
the claimed invention in context. 156 Doing so helps one understand 
how a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would interpret 
the claims.157 Therefore, consulting the specification during claim 
interpretation is both beneficial and logical. 
In contrast, another canon indicates that limitations from the 
specification should not be read into the claims.158 A claim term's 
meaning should not be altered or changed by the specification's 
statements. This canon is based on the view that if the specification 
dictates the definition of the patent's scope of exclusivity, the patent 
claims no longer play their statutory role in patent law. The patent 
claims, not the specification, are charged with the task of "particu-
larly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which 
the applicant regards as his invention."159 If limitations from the 
specification are allowed to control the claim language's meaning, 
the claim's statutorily charged function is frustrated. For these 
reasons, this canon instructs against changing a claim's meaning 
based on the specification's teachings. 
These two canons can ~oexist. A claim term's meaning can be 
informed, but not improperly limited, by the specification. Combin-
ing the canons establishes the patent claim as the ultimate informer 
of a claim's meaning, while recognizing that the claim does not exist 
in a vacuum in the patent document; other information about the 
invention exists in the specification. 16° Courts have attempted to 
flush out the relationship between the canons by explaining the 
154. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
155. Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
156. On·Line Techs., Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin·Elmer GMBH, 386 F.3d 1133, 1138 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
157. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966); Astrazeneca, 384 F.3d at 1337 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004); Vanderlande Indus. Nederland BV v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 366 F.3d 1311, 1318 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
158. Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
159. 35 u.s.c. § 112 (2000). 
160. See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (noting that both canons share similar underlying principles); Wagner & Petherbridge, 
supra note 10, at 1133. 
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particular instances where specification information can be used. 
For example, if the patentee defines a claim term expressly in the 
specification, that definition can be used when interpreting the 
claims without violating the canon regarding improperly reading in 
limitations from the specification.161 
As the Federal Circuit, academics, and practitioners recognize, 
however, a real tension exists in practice between these two 
canons.162 The exact point at which referencing the specification 
during interpretation changes from properly "reading the claims in 
light of specification" to improperly "reading limitation from the 
specification into the claims" is impossible to identify with any 
specificity.163 A "fine line" exists that divides the two canons/64 and 
often that line becomes blurred and undefinable. How does one 
allow the specification to inform the claim interpretation process 
without placing any limits on claim terms? Distinguishing between 
"reading in light of' an informational source and "reading in 
limitation from" that same source is difficult.165 
Because of the tension between these two canons, courts tend to 
adopt claim interpretation methodologies that lean towards one 
canon or the other. A given methodology will either allow the 
specification to play a significant role during claim construction or 
will have the specification play little or no role at all. The specifica-
tion's influence depends on whether the court wants to ensure that 
the claims are read in the context of the specification or wants to 
ensure that limitations are not read in from the specification. 
Depending on which canon a court attempts to observe in its 
interpretative approach, the specification may have a large or small 
influence on the resulting definition. This is depicted graphically on 
a spectrum in Figure 2 below. The two canons are at each end of the 
spectrum and the specification's influence on the resulting claim 
161. See Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
162. See Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 
Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1133. 
163. See 1 DONALDS. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS§ 3.02[1)[g)[ii][B) & n.83 (97th release 
2005) (''The line between interpreting claim language in light of the specification and reading 
a limitation from the specification into the claim is a fine one."). 
164. See Comark Commc'ns, 156 F.3d at 1186-87. 
165. AI; Wagner and Petherbridge put it, "at what point does an appropriately contextual 
analysis spill over into impermissible importation of meaning into the claims?'' Wagner & 
Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1133. 
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definition decreases as a court moves from left to right, that is, away 
from the first canon and towards the second. 
Figure 2 
"Read 
in Light of' 
"Not Read 
in Limitations from" 
Specification's Influence Decreasing 
Although no current claim interpretation methodology sits at 
either end of the spectrum, methodologies do occupy areas in 
between. To provide further examples of ·how using different 
canons results in different interpretation methodologies, the two 
most utilized methodologies, which the Federal Circuit examined en 
bane in Phillips III, 166 will now be explored. 
C. Majority and Dissent in the Phillips v. AWH Corporation Panel 
Decision: An Example of Two Different Claim Interpretation 
Methodologies 
The majority's and dissent's opinions in the Federal Circuit's 
panel opinion in Phillips I provide a good example of methodologies 
that use the specification in different ways. 167 The majority refers 
to the whole specification early in the claim construction process, 
using all of the information contained therein to inform its defini-
tion of the claim term at issue. The majority's approach favors the 
canon of reading the claims in light of the specification. This 
methodology sits towards the left, that is, the "read in light of' end 
of the spectrum in Figure 2. In contrast, the dissent relies little on 
the specification's teachings, employing a heavy presumption in 
166. Phillips v. A WH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, at *2-3 
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane). 
167. The fact that the majority and dissent in Phillips /provide such good examples of two 
distinct interpretation methodologies most likely played a significant role in the Federal 
Circuit's choice to take the Phillips case en bane. 
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favor of the ordinary meaning of the patent's claim language, as 
derived preferably from a dictionary, when construing the claim 
language. The dissent therefore sits closer to the right, that is, the 
"not read limitation in from" end of the spectrum in Figure 2. Both 
of the methodologies employed in Phillips I and analyzed in Phillips 
III will be described in more detail below. 
1. The Majority's Methodology's Full and Early Use of the 
Specification 
The Federal Circuit's majority panel decision in Phillips I 
provides a good example of a claim interpretation approach that 
uses the specification's teachings fully and early in the process. 168 
The patent at issue in Phillips I concerned fire, sound, and impact 
resistant modular wall panels. 169 These modular panels are used to 
construct detention facilities, such as jails, vaults, or safety 
barriers.170 As the patent claim's preamble details, the claimed 
"[b]uilding modules [are] adapted to fit together for construction 
of fire, sound and impact resistant security barriers and rooms 
for use in securing records and persons ... .''171 Edward Phillips, the 
named inventor and owner of the patent, sued AWH Corporation 
for infringement of his patent on vandalism-resistant building 
modules. 172 
168. 363 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane). This 
full and early use of the specification can be considered part, but not all, of the "holistic 
approach" identified by other commentators. See Barney, supra note 13, at 105-06 (identifying 
the holistic approach to claim construction); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1133-
36 (same). In the interest of avoiding unnecessary confusion, this Article does not use the term 
"holistic approach" to identify the methodology currently under discussion. 
169. Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1209 (noting that the patent at issue was U.S. Patent No. 
4,677,798) (filed Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7, 1987)). 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 1209-10 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (filed Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7, 
1987)). Claim preambles do not always limit a claim's scope. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 
Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998). However, preambles can provide a better 
understanding of the invention being claimed. See Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. 
Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("A preamble may provide context for claim 
construction .... "). 
172. Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1210. 
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On appeal, Mr. Phillips and AWH Corporation disputed the 
meaning of the claim term ''baffles."173 The claims at issue use the 
term ''baffles" in their detailing of the "internal steel baffles ex-
tending inwardly from the steel shell walls" of the claimed modular 
building panels. 174 The claimed ''baffles" reside inside the invention's 
steel shell that is comprised of two outer steel plate panel sections 
that form the building panels. 175 Mr. Phillips asserted that ''baffles" 
should be given "its ordinary and customary meaning."176 Mr. 
Phillips argued that ''baffles" should mean something "obstructing, 
impeding, or checking the flow of something."177 Mr. Phillips next 
asserted that the ''heavy presumption" in favor of this ordinary 
meaning was "not clearly and unequivocally rebutted,"178 and 
therefore, additional limitations to the term ''baffles" should not be 
read in from the patent's specification. 179 
A WH asked the Federal Circuit to construe the term ''baffles" to 
reflect the teachings in the patent's specification.180 AWH asserted 
that the district court "properly looked to the specification to 
determine the scope of the claimed invention."181 The specification, 
A WH argued, emphasized "the key innovative feature of the in-
vention," namely, the ''baffle configuration, including both the 
angled orientation and the interlocking pattern limitations" of the 
173. Id. at 1210-11. 
174. Id. at 1209-10 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (filed Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7, 
1987)) (emphasis added). Mr. Phillips asserted claims 1, 21, 22, 24, 25, and 26 of his patent 
against AWH, all of which included the ''baffles" element. Id. at 1210. 
175. Id. at 1209-10. 
176. Id. at 1211. 
177. Id. at 1210. Interestingly, both Mr. Phillips and AWH stipulated to this ordinary 
meaning before the district court. Id. The district court, however, found the claim language 
to be drafted in means-plus-function format and, therefore, governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 
(2000). Id. The district court's claim interpretation limited the meaning of baffles to the 
structures disclosed in the specification and their equivalents, which required the baffles to 
"extend inward from the shell walls at oblique or acute angles" and "form an intermediate, 
interlocking barrier in the interior of the wall module." Id. Mr. Phillips conceded 
noninfringement under this construction and, thus, appealed the construction. Id. at 1210-11. 
178. Id. at 1211. 
179. Id. These additional limitations, Mr. Phillips contested, were that the baffles "must 
be positioned at an acute or obtuse angle to wall faces, and that baffles must form an 
intermediate, interlocking barrier." Id. 
180. Id. at 1211-12. AWH supported the district court's opinion that, while finding the 
claim language to be drafted in means-plus-function language, included limitations discerned 
from the specification's teachings. Id. 
181. Id. at 1211. 
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claimed baffles inside the modular panel's steel shell. 182 Therefore, 
the claims' scope should be construed to include baffles with angle 
orientations and interlocking patterns to facilitate the building 
module's impact-resistant characteristics.183 
The majority in Phillips I proceeded to construe the term ''baffles" 
by fully referring to the specification early in the interpretation 
process. The majority agreed with A WH, finding the specification 
particularly enlightening about the meaning of the claim term 
''baffles."184 The court looked to the specification to determine the 
term's meaning "in the context of the entirety of [Mr. Phillips'] 
invention."185 The court found the specification "rife with references" 
to the claimed building modules' impact-resistant properties. 186 In 
particular, the court focused on the specification's descriptions of 
the baffles as being "disposed at such angles that bullets which 
might penetrate outer steel panels [would be] deflected."187 The 
baffles' angular position is shown further in the patent's drawings, 
depicting the baffles "disposed at angles which tend to deflect the 
bullets."188 The court also noted that the patent's specification 
does not depict or describe the baffles at a ninety-degree angle, 
which cannot deflect projectiles directed at the building module.189 
The majority concluded that the term ''baffles" used in the asserted 
claim must include baffles angled at degrees other than ninety 
degrees. 190 As the court articulated, "[i]t is impossible to derive 
anything else from the specification."191 
182. Id. at 1212. 
183. Id. at 1211-12. 
184. Id. at 1212. 
185. Id. at 1213 (quoting Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998)). 
186. Id. The court noted that "[i]n the section marked 'Disclosure of the Invention,' the 
patentee states that the baflles are 'disposed at such angles that bullets which might 
penetrate the outer steel panels are deflected.m Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (flied 
Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7, 1987)). 
187. Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (filed Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7, 1987)). 
188. Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677, 798 (filed Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7, 1987)). In 
particular, the court pointed to Figures 6 and 12 of the patent, which are described as showing 
the angular nature of the baflles that deflects bullets that can penetrate the steel shell of the 
invented building panels. Id. 
189. Id. at 1213-14. 
190. Id. at 1214. 
191. Id. The majority noted that the patentee stated, at the end of the specification, that 
the '"invention has advanced the art by providing modular buildings and modules of high 
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The court concluded its claim interpretation analysis by summa-
rizing the methodology it employed: 
It is true that claims with the non-restrictive term "baffles" were 
allowed. However, the patent specification is intended to support 
and inform the claims, and here it makes it unmistakably clear 
that the invention involves baffles angled at other than go·. It is 
in the interests of a sound patent system and inventors, as well 
as the public, to hold inventors to their disclosures. The trial 
judge correctly perceived this need ... and interpreted the claims 
in accordance with the specification.192 
The majority in Phillips I noted the claim term's ordinary 
meaning at the beginning of its analysis, but immediately consid-
ered it in light of the other intrinsic evidence available, particularly 
the specification.193 The court attempted to follow the interpretation 
canon requiring patent claims to be read in the context of all of 
the specification's teachings. The court did not favor a claim term's 
ordinary meaning over other intrinsic evidence or employ any 
presumption for one type of interpretative source over another. 194 
The specification, and its meaning to those skilled in the art, was 
investigated with great detail to determine how the claim term at 
issue fit within the described invention's scope. 
The majority did, however, try to limit the specification's influ-
ence on the claim's definition. Only information about the "inven-
tion" in the specification was used to construe the claim language.195 
Although the full specification was examined early in the process, 
only those parts relevant to the invention were used. In trying to 
narrow its use of the specification, the majority's methodology gave 
some credence, albeit very little, to the interpretation canon against 
reading in limitations from the specification. 
strength [and] bullet resistance,' adding that '(u]niquely the advantages of steel shell modules 
are combined with thermal and acoustical isolation of two spaced walls and protection against 
bullet penetration of the walls."' ld. at 1213 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677, 798 (filed Apr. 14, 
1986) (issued July 7, 1987)) (alterations in original). 
192. Id. at 1214. 
193. Id. at 1212-13. 
194. ld. at 1212-14. A dictionary was used to determine whether the term ''baffles" did not 
recite any structure and, therefore, was means-plus-function language. Id. at 1212. A 
dictionary did not, however, provide the meaning of the term ''baffles" that the majority 
adopted. 
195. Id. at 1212-14. 
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The methodology's full and early use of the specification clearly 
leans toward using more rather than less of the specification when 
interpreting claims. The majority's approach allows the full extent 
of the specification's teachings to have a significant influence on the 
resulting claim interpretation. This places the methodology near the 
left end of the spectrum in Figure 2. From this point forward, this 
Article will refer to this methodology as the "specification methodol-
ogy."196 
2. The Dissent's Methodology's Heavy Presumption in Favor of 
Dictionaries 
The dissent's claim analysis in Phillips I exemplifies a methodol-
ogy that does not allow the specification to influence greatly the 
resulting interpretation. Instead, the ordinary meaning ofthe claim 
term at issue is favored by utilizing a heavy presumption toward the 
term's dictionary definition. 197 The dissent implemented this 
methodology by first identifying the disputed claim term's ordinary 
meaning.198 The ordinary meaning was taken from a dictionary, in 
this case the 2002 edition of Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary.199 The dissent then looked for evidence that would 
overcome the heavy presumption favoring this ordinary meaning 
and that would warrant the inclusion of the angle orientation limi-
tation in its claim interpretation of ''baffies," as A WH suggested. 200 
The dissent looked to the specification to discern whether "the 
patentee, acting as his own lexicographer, gave a special meaning 
to the term baffies."201 The dissent found nothing to indicate that the 
patentee affirmatively redefined the term ''baffies" to be limited to 
196. The methodology is given this name to emphasize the specification-centric approach. 
197. The heavy presumption in favor of ordinary meaning can be considered part, but not 
all, of the "procedural approach" identified by other commentators. See Barney, supra note 13, 
at 103-06 (identifying the procedural approach to claim construction); Wagner & Petherbridge, 
supra note 10, at 1133-36 (same). In the interest of avoiding unnecessary confusion, this 
Article does not use the term "procedural approach" to identify the methodology currently 
under discussion. 
198. Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1216-17 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part). 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 1217-18 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part) (finding no support for adding further 
structural limitations to the ordinary meaning of "baffies"). 
201. Id. at 1217 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part). 
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baffles oriented at angles other than ninety degrees.202 In addition, 
the dissent found no disclaimer as to any part of the ordinary 
meaning in the specification or the prosecution history. 203 With this, 
the dissent saw nothing that suggested a deviation from the 
"general purpose dictionary definition" of the term ''baffles" and, 
therefore, adopted this ordinary meaning as the correct claim 
construction.204 The claims simply require baffles, regardless of how 
the baffles are oriented between the steel shells of the claimed 
modular panels. 205 
The dissent addressed the parts of the specification that the 
majority relied upon in reaching its construction.206 The dissent 
viewed the majority's approach as improperly limiting the claim 
language to the only disclosed embodiment in the specification. 207 
Although the only embodiment described baffles without a ninety-
degree orientation, "no such language clearly limit[s] the claims to 
[this] specific structure."208 The dissent also disputed the majority's 
reading of the invention's purpose.209 The specification also identi-
fied the invention as having several objectives beyond impact 
resistance, such as fire and sound suppression. 210 The term ''baffles," 
therefore, could not be limited to fulfilling only the impact resis-
tance objective.211 Lacking clear disclaimers on any part of the 
ordinary meaning, the dissent concluded that the specification does 
not limit the dictionary definition of ''baffles."212 
The dissent summarized the claim interpretation methodology as 
follows: "Since there is no argument here that one of skill in the art 
would ascribe a specialized meaning to the term baffles, and there 
has been no disclaimer in the specification or prosecution history, 
202. Id. at 1217-18 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part). 
203. Id. at 1218 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 1217-18 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part) (refuting the grounds upon which the 
majority based its interpretation). 
207. Id. at 1217 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part) (citing Federal Circuit case law counseling 
against restricting claims to covering the one disclosed embodiment in the specification). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 1217-18 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part). 
211. Id. (noting that the specification discusses the additional objectives of ''high load 
bearing strength" and "thermal and acoustical isolation of two spaced walls") (quoting U.S. 
Patent No. 4,677,798 (filed Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7, 1987)). 
212. Id. at 1218 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part). 
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the general purpose dictionary definition, 'something for deflecting, 
checking, or otherwise regulating flow,' applies."213 
The dissent's analysis demonstrates a methodology that favors 
the canon against reading limitations from the specification into the 
claim.214 The dissent's approach implements this canon by placing 
the claim language and its ordinary meaning well above any of the 
specification's teachings. It insulates the claim terms from the 
specification by using a heavy presumption in favor of an informa-
tion source outside of the patent-a dictionary. 
The dissent's approach still refers to the specification, presumably 
in an attempt to follow the canon requiring the claims to be read 
in light of the specification. The dissent's methodology, however, 
takes a restricted view of the specification and its role in claim 
construction. A dictionary and not the specification is consulted first 
to determine the claim term's ordinary meaning.215 The dissent's 
methodology looks at the specification, but only to see if the heavy 
presumption is rebutted. The specification is examined to see if the 
patentee acted as her own lexicographer.216 The heavy presumption 
could have been overcome if the patentee defined the claim term 
clearly in the specification.217 The heavy presumption could also be 
overcome if a clear disclaimer of all or part of a claim term's 
ordinary meaning exists.218 As the dissent's analysis demon-
strates, the specification must manifest an express, affirmative 
disclaimer. 219 
213. ld. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 162 (2002)) (citations 
omitted). 
214. In fact, the dissent claims that the majority's methodology violates this canon. !d. at 
1217-19 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part). 
215. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1201-05 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see 
also Ruoyu Roy Wang, Note, Texas Digital Systems v. Telegenix, Inc.: Toward a More 
Formalistic Patent Claim Construction Model, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 153, 163-65 (2004) 
(noting that dictionaries should be consulted first and before the intrinsic record). 
216. See Tex. Digital, 308 F.3d at 1204. 
217. Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351 F.3d 1364, 1368-70 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The heavy 
presumption can also be overcome if the patentee clearly defines the claim term in the 
prosecution history. See id. at 1371-72. 
218. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (''The 
patentee may demonstrate an intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning 
of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or 
restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope."). 
219. Id. 
90 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:49 
The dissent's methodology employing a heavy presumption in 
favor of dictionary definitions over the specification greatly favors 
the canon against reading limitations from the specification into the 
claims. Although the approach references the specification, it does 
so later in the construction process and through the lens of the 
heavy presumption. This severely limits the influence that the 
specification's teachings can have on the resulting claim interpreta-
tion. Only in limited circumstances can information in the specifica-
tion influence the claim's meaning.220 The dissent's approach, 
therefore, can be placed near the right end of the spectrum in Figure 
2. From this point forward, this Article will refer to this methodol-
ogy as the ''heavy presumption methodology."221 
D. En Bane Decision in Phillips v. AWH Corporation: The 
Federal Circuit Selects a Claim Interpretation Methodology 
On July 12, 2005, the Federal Circuit issued its en bane opinion 
in Phillips u. AWH Corp.-Phillips II/.222 As noted in the en bane 
order in Phillips II, 223 the court took the case en bane to review the 
two methodologies employed in the panel opinion, Phillips I, and 
select a single claim interpretation methodology. 224 The Phillips III 
decision, therefore, provides further critical discussion of claim 
interpretation methodology. 225 In particular, the court further 
analyzes the two methodologies employed by the majority and 
dissent in Phillips I and applies the methodology it selects. 226 
The Federal Circuit initially examined the proper use of the 
specification and dictionaries in claim interpretation.227 Mter 
220. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips I), 363 F.3d 1207, 1217-18 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, 
J., dissenting in part) (detailing the limited circumstances under which the specification is 
referenced), vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane). 
221. The methodology is given this name because of its usage of a heavy presumption. 
222. Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331 (Fed. 
Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane). 
223. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips II), 376 F.3d 1382, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en 
bane). 
224. See Phillips III, 2005 WL 1620331, at *2-4 (noting that the court took the case en bane 
to settle the "principle question that this case presents ... the extent to which we should' resort 
to and rely on a patent's specification in seeking to ascertain the proper scope of its claims"). 
225. See id. at *4-16 (discussing and analyzing the different claim interpretation sources 
and interpretative canons). 
226. See id.; see also id. at *2-3, *17-20. 
227. See id. at *7-16. 
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discussing the current state of the law in the area, the Federal 
Circuit endorsed the specification methodology.228 The en bane 
opinion emphasized the importance of the specification's role in 
claim interpretation.229 This "importance of the specification in 
claim construction derives from its statutory role," specifically the 
requirement that the specification must describe the claimed 
invention.230 "It is therefore entirely appropriate for a court, when 
conducting claim construction, to rely heavily on the written 
description for guidance as to the meaning of the claims."231 
The court, in turn, explicitly rejected the heavy presumption 
methodology.232 This methodology, in the court's view, "placed too 
much reliance on extrinsic sources such as dictionaries, treatises, 
and encyclopedias and too little on intrinsic sources, in particular 
the specification and prosecution history."233 The court was worried 
specifically because the heavy presumption methodology requires 
the reference to external definitional sources before any reference 
is made to the specification.234 Such a requirement "improperly 
restricts the role of the specification in claim construction" and, as 
a result, "focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words 
rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the 
patent."235 
Having adopted the specification methodology, the court then 
applied the methodology to the claim term ''baffles."236 The court 
initially referenced the patent's intrinsic evidence, including the 
228. See id. at *9, *13-15 (endorsing usage of the specification and expressly rejecting the 
heavy presumption in favor of dictionaries). Not all members of the court agreed with the 
court's adoption of the specification methodology. See Phillips III, 2005 WL 1620331, at *22-26 
(Mayer, J., dissenting) (arguing that "any attempt to fashion a coherent standard under" the 
concept that claim interpretation is a matter of law "is pointless, as illustrated by our many 
failed attempts to do so"). · 
229. See Phillips III, 2005 WL 1620331, at *7-9 (noting that the specification's important 
role in claim interpretation ''has a long pedigree in Supreme Court decisions"). 
230. See id. at *8-9. The court also focused on the USPTO's heavy reliance on the 
specification during prosecution as an additional endorsement of the full use of the 
specification during claim interpretation. See id. 
231. Id. at *9. 
232. See id. *13-15 (rejecting the Texas Digital line of cases that established the heavy 
presumption in favor of external definitional sources). 
233. Id. at *13 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at *13-14. 
236. See id. at *17-18. 
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patent's claims and specification.237 The claims were seen as not 
specifically restricting the claimed baffles placement to any par-
ticular angle.238 The court then turned to the patent's specification. 
The en bane court looked at the specification to determine how a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claimed 
''baffles."239 The court found that the specification "setD forth 
multiple objectives to be served by the baffles recited in the 
claims."240 Because the disclosed invention went beyond including 
baffles just to deflect projectiles, the invention did not require the 
claimed baffles to always be at acute or obtuse angles. 241 The court 
concluded that, because the disclosed invention was not limited to 
include baffles at only angles other than ninety degrees, the claim 
term ''baffles" should not be so limited. 242 
The court in Phillips III clearly employs the specification 
methodology. The Federal Circuit does not accord the dictionary 
definition of ''baffles" a heavy presumption.243 Instead, the court 
follows the same approach as the majority in Phillips I. The 
intrinsic evidence, particularly the specification, is referenced early 
in the interpretation process, and the specification is fully examined 
to determine the extent of the invention disclosed to one skilled in 
the relevant art. 
Notably, the en bane court in Phillips III reaches a different 
conclusion as to the specification's teaching about the invention 
than the majority in Phillips I. 244 The en bane court views the extent 
of the specification's teachings, and thus the disclosed invention, to 
237. See id. 
238. See id. at *17 (noting that the claim language did not explicitly limit the angular 
orientation of the claimed baffies). 
239. See id. at *17. 
240. See id. at *17-18 (indicating that the patent's specification disclosed other functions 
for the claimed baffles, including provision "structural support" and "an intermediate barrier 
wall between the opposite [wall] faces") (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (filed Apr. 14, 1986) 
(issued July 7, 1987)) (alteration in original). 
241. See id. at *18. 
242. See id. (noting that, in light of the breadth of the disclosed invention, "the term 
'baffies' should not be read restrictively to require that the baffles in each case serve all of the 
recited functions"). 
243. See id. at *17. The court does cite the definition, but does not give the definition any 
real weight in the interpretation process. See id. 
244. See Phillips III, 2005 WL 1620331, *20-22 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting that the en bane court used the same methodology as employed by 
the majority in Phillips I, but reached the opposite construction). 
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be broader than the majority in Phillips I. Put another way, with 
reference to the visual depiction of the specification's teachings in 
Figure 1, the court in Phillips III views the area of the disclosed 
invention to cover more area than the majority in Phillips I. This 
difference does not, however, take away from the fact that the 
methodology selected and applied by the en bane court in Phillips 
III is similar to the methodology employed by the majority in 
Phillips I-the specification methodology. The opinions do not differ 
in methodology, but in their understanding of the patent at issue. 
Ill. EVALUATING CLAIM INTERPRETATION METHODOLOGIES 
The lack of a clear statutory direction leaves methodology 
formulation and selection in the courts' hands. The Federal Circuit, 
which has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, 245 has been the 
most active in this area.246 The panel decision in Phillips I demon-
strates the court's activities, with the majority and dissent employ-
ing two separate interpretation methodologies.247 The court's en 
bane opinion in Phillips III also evidences the Federal Circuit 
playing a major role in this area. 248 
A duty to select a single methodology has come with the discre-
tion to create varied methodologies. The Federal Circuit assumed 
this duty in Phillips III, when it adopted a unitary methodol-
ogy-the specification methodology-for itself and lower courts to 
use. 249 The consistent usage of one approach to claim interpretation 
falls in line with the congressional mandate behind the Federal 
245. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000). But see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air 
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002); Christopher A. Cotropia, "Arising Under" 
Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 286-302 
(2003) (explaining how the Holmes decision disturbed the Federal Circuit's exclusive 
jurisdiction). 
246. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and Information Costs, 9 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 58 (2005) (noting the immense Federal Circuit jurisprudence on 
the issue of claim interpretation after the Supreme Court's decision in Markman); Romary & 
Michelsohn, supra note 15, at 1889-92; Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1124-25 
(studying the Federal Circuit's performance in the area of claim interpretation). 
247. See generally Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips 1), 363 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 
vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane). 
248. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331 
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane). 
249. See id. 
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Circuit's creation.250 Also, the Supreme Court's decision in Markman 
concerning claim interpretation arguably requires courts to adopt 
a single approach. 251 
In addition to the legal reasons, normative rationales exist for 
settling on one interpretation methodology for all courts. A single 
approach facilitates true substantive review of district court 
decisions by the Federal Circuit. If all courts use a single methodol-
ogy, appellate review can focus on whether district courts properly 
executed the methodology, instead of starting the process anew by 
selecting a different methodology, followed by construing the claims 
accordingly. A unitary methodology approach also eases the burden 
on the district courts, allowing them to focus only on properly 
implementing the methodology. Furthermore, a single, agreed-upon 
methodology also helps those outside the litigation setting to 
evaluate patents and their scope. 252 Uncertainty in the methodology 
that a court will use severely hampers the ability of parties to 
predict the exact scope of exclusivity a patent gives its owner. 
Evaluating the available methodologies is the first step in 
rationally choosing a single claim interpretation approach. This 
Part will undertake a deeper examination of the evaluation process, 
first focusing on the need to develop one or more evaluation 
benchmarks. Such criteria are needed to facilitate the comparison 
among methodologies. Evaluation criteria also instill a normative 
baseline into the comparison process, ensuring that the chosen 
methodology maximizes the normative goals embedded in the 
criteria. 
The certainty standard used currently when evaluating claims is 
then discussed. Almost all courts and commentators evaluate how 
claims are interpreted under this criterion. 253 The Federal Circuit 
identified this criterion in its en bane order in Phillips II and 
250. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized 
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1989); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1114-17 
(discussing the mandate of the Federal Circuit, in particular the mandate in relation to claim 
interpretation jurisprudence). 
251. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-91 (1996); Wagner & 
Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1120-24. 
252. See Dreyfuss, supra note 250, at 7 (noting how commentators believe that "certainty 
and predictability" in patent law can "foster technological growth and industrial innovation 
and ... facilitate business planning''). 
253. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., (Phillips II), 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en 
bane); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1176. 
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mentioned it multiple times in its en bane opinion in Phillips 111.254 
The main rationale behind using this criterion is that it ensures 
that the resulting interpretation maximizes the public notice 
function of patent claims. However, this criterion overlooks the 
certainty-maximizing effects of simply choosing a single methodol-
ogy. In addition, diminishing returns exist as one tries to modify a 
methodology to get closer to absolute certainty and uniformity. 
Finally, focusing strictly on certainty as the sole standard for 
evaluating interpretation methodology overlooks the other and more 
important function of patent claims-the substantive function of 
defining the patent's scope of exclusivity. 
A. Need for Evaluation Criteria 
Adopting a criterion or set of criteria for use when evaluating how 
a legal instrument is interpreted is nothing new to law. In both 
contract interpretation and statutory interpretation, scholars and 
courts have discussed which interpretation methods are better.255 
These discussions usually begin by setting forth how the different 
approaches will be judged.256 These judgments are made based on a 
defined set of criteria. For example, methods of statutory interpreta-
tion have been judged as to their "predictability," their "political 
neutrality," their observance to the separation of powers, and their 
"pragmatism."257 The criteria used in comparing contract interpreta-
tion methods is just as varied. 258 
Using evaluation criteria facilitates the comparison of different 
methodologies. The only rational way to select among varying 
approaches is to judge them against the same standard and compare 
254. Phillips III at *11 (discussing how reliance on extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, 
undermines the "public notice function of patents"); see also id. at *15 (indicating that the 
adopted methodology can be implemented with "reasonable certainty and predictability''); 
Phillips II, 376 F. 3d at 1383 (asking, in question one, whether "the public notice function of 
patent claims [is] better served" under one methodology as opposed to the other). 
255. See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract 
Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 496-98 (2004); Timothy P. Terrell, Statutory 
Epistemology: Mapping the Interpretation Debate, 53 EMORYL.J. 523, 524-25 (2004). 
256. See, e.g., Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 
585, 696-718 (1996) (asking which statutory interpretation methodology is "most public-
regarding"). 
257. See Terrell, supra note 255, at 531. 
258. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 255, at 497-98 (noting that contract interpretation 
methodologies are characterized as either formal or substantive). 
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the results. The best scoring method is the one that most closely 
meets the evaluation criteria. For example, Eskridge has argued 
for a "dynamic" statutory interpretation methodology.259 He has 
suggested such a methodology because it furthers a particular 
normative rationale, a criterion that a statute's meaning should 
adapt, in some cases, to the current social values.260 Without a clear 
criterion, assessment of Eskridge's dynamic statutory interpretation 
methodology becomes difficult, if not impossible. Without evaluation 
criteria, one would never be sure if one methodology is truly ''better" 
than the other. 
Establishing criteria for evaluating methodologies also properly 
interjects a normative element into the selection process. Embedded 
in any criterion is a normative rationale that the criterion attempts 
to maximize. Judging methodologies based on their performance 
under a particular criterion helps to ferret out the norm or norms 
operating within the interpretative approaches. 261 Therefore, not 
only does an evaluation criterion facilitate the assessment and 
comparison process, but a criterion also brings the necessary 
normative analysis into the selection process. The values that a 
methodology furthers are brought to the forefront. Criteria give a 
true reason why one methodology is normatively better than 
another. If a methodology does not score well under a given 
criterion, that methodology is disfavored because it does not further 
the normative principle embedded in the criterion. Most do not 
quibble with the need for evaluation criteria when trying to choose 
among different interpretation regimes. Often much disagreement 
exists, however, over the exact criteria to use, and this disagreement 
is usually founded on a dispute over the propriety of the normative 
rationale underlying the criteria.262 Currently, such a disagreement 
does not exist in the claim interpretation context. Courts and 
commentators only really use one criterion--certainty. 
259. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 
(1987). 
260. Id. at 1482-96 (describing the concept of dynamic statutory interpretation). 
261. See Terrell, supra note 255, at 531-32 (noting the norms "at work behind the 
interpretative techniques" in the statutory interpretation context). 
262. See id. at 523-34 (noting the ferocity of the debate regarding the statutory 
interpretation). 
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B. Certainty as an Evaluation Criterion 
The certainty criterion is the most widely utilized criterion for 
evaluating claim interpretation methodologies.263 Courts and 
commentators currently judge claim interpretation methodologies 
on whether they provide certainty about the patent claim's 
meaning. 264 If a particular method provides predictable results and 
others can successfully replicate it, that methodology scores well 
under the certainty criterion.265 Conversely, if a given approach's 
resulting claim meaning is tough to predict and duplicate, that 
approach fails under the certainty criterion and should not be 
used. 266 
The certainty criterion is used to ensure that a methodology 
furthers the normative goal of providing public notice about the 
exact patent scope of exclusivity. If the way that claims are 
construed causes claim definitions to be unpredictable for the public 
and courts, that method thwarts the notice aspect of patent claims. 
Such methodologies would make it difficult for any patent observer 
to be sure of a claim term's meaning. 267 An interpretation process 
that produces erratic results is also not replicated easily by 
reviewing courts, patent holders, and other interested parties. If a 
methodology creates uncertainty, it impedes the claim's ability to 
communicate the patent's scope to the public and the patent holder. 
The usage of the certainty criterion tries to make sure that the 
patent claim's public notice function is not hampered, but furthered, 
by the claim interpretation methodology used. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Markman emphasizes cer-
tainty as a main goal for claim interpretation.268 In Markman, the 
Supreme Court concluded that claim interpretation questions were 
263. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390-91 (1996). Other 
evaluation criteria have been employed, but not to the extent of the certainty criterion. Nard, 
in addition to looking at certainty, considers which methodology observes the "proper 
allocation of interpretive authority." Nard, supra note 57, at 64-79. 
264. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 
1620331, at *10-13, *15 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane); Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips 
II), 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane). 
265. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1176. 
266. ld. 
267. ld. at 1171-72, 1176. 
268. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390-91. 
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"reserved entirely for the court."269 In formulating this conclusion, 
the Court addressed what constituted a good claim interpretation 
methodology. 270 The Court found it important to ensure that claim 
construction promoted certainty and uniformity because "[t]he 
limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, 
the encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the 
assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately 
to the public."271 By providing· certainty, claim construction provides 
public notice of the patent claim's subject matter.272 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Markman, the Federal 
Circuit has also focused on establishing a claim interpretation 
methodology that furthers the claim's public notice function. 273 In its 
recent en bane opinion on claim interpretation, Phillips III, the 
Federal Circuit referenced the certainty criterion when justifying 
its selection of the specification methodology. The court made a 
point to recognize that the methodology scored well under the 
criterion. 274 For example, when discussing whether the methodology 
can maintain the balance between the competing canons of reading 
the claims in light of the specification and not reading limitations 
from the specification into the claims, the court concluded that 
the methodology could maintain such a balance "with reasonable 
certainty and predictability."275 
Most commentators have criticized current claim interpretation 
under the certainty criterion.276 They have looked at how the 
269. !d. at 372. 
270. !d. at 388-91. 
271. Id. at 390 (alteration in original) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 
304 u.s. 364, 369 (1938)). 
272. !d. 
273. See Romary & Michelsohn, supra note 15, at 1892 ("[T]he Federal Circuit ... has 
renewed its focus on adequate public notice as perhaps the fundamental constraint on the 
claim interpretation process."). 
274. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286,2005 WL 1620331, at 
*15 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane). 
275. !d. Notably, the court's opinion also included statements that evidence some 
recognition by the court of the linkage between methodology and claim scope. See id. at *14, 
*16 (noting how the heavy presumption methodology "cause[s] the construction of the claim 
to be unduly expansive" and the specification methodology creates a claim scope "of the actual 
invention more accurately"). 
276. See Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The 
Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 209-
17 (2001) (analyzing the reasons behind uncertainty in claim construction); Dave A. Ghatt & 
Timothy B. Kang, Claim Interpretation: A Regression to Uncertain Times, 84 J. PAT. & 
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Federal Circuit interprets claims and asked which method provides 
the most certainty about a claim's meaning or is the most predict-
able in the meaning that it produces.277 Like the courts, commenta-
tors evaluate methodologies based on whether they further the 
claim's public notice function, 278 and they adopt certainty as the 
criterion to judge whether a particular approach meets the goal of 
public notice. 
C. Shortcomings of Certainty as a Criterion 
Overemphasis should not be placed on certainty as an evaluation 
criterion. To begin, certainty as a criterion does little to differentiate 
between methodologies. Regardless of a methodology's specifics, an 
inherent certainty is created once courts decide on a single method-
ology.279 The discretion left to the courts when approaching claim 
construction creates an uncertainty itself. Because no statute 
describes exactly how courts should interpret claims, observers 
must look to the courts for guidance on interpretation issues. 
Without clear direction from the courts in the form of a single 
methodology, one cannot predict a claim's meaning because of the 
uncertainty about which methodology will be used. One does not 
know, for example, where on the spectrum in Figure 2 a court's 
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'¥ 456, 464-69 (2002) (arguing that early reference to the specification 
creates uncertainty by clouding the proper interpretation of the claims); Ben Hattenbach, 
Chickens, Eggs and Other Impediments to Escalating Reliance on Dictionaries in Patent Claim 
Construction, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'¥ 181, 189-90 (2003) (contending that 
consulting the dictionary leads to uncertain results); Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence 
Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 759-62 (1999) (noting that litigation delays 
compound the harm caused by uncertainty); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1176 
(evaluating the procedural and holistic approach in terms of applicability in "a consistent and 
predictable manner"); Wang, supra note 215, at 167-69 (praising a formalist approach that 
promotes certainty by minimizing judicial discretion). 
277. See, e.g., Hattenbach, supra note 276, at 189-90 (arguing that the procedural approach 
produces uncertainty). 
278. See supra note 254. 
279. Certainty is the driving force behind those commentators who want the Federal 
Circuit to adopt a single methodology. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1176; 
see also Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the 
Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1191 (1999) (noting that "[t]he problem most 
frequently mentioned by practitioners" as the source of the uncertainty of the Federal 
Circuit's decision "is known as 'panel-dependency"'); Matthew F. Weil & William C. Rooklidge, 
Stare Un-Decisis: The Sometimes Rough Treatment of Precedent in Federal Circuit Decision-
Making, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'¥ 791, 804-07 (1998). 
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methodology will fall, and thus, how much influence the court will 
afford the specification. Once a court selects a point on the spectrum 
and publicly identifies it in a decision with precedential value, a 
degree of certainty is necessarily achieved. This predictability is 
achieved regardless of the adopted methodology's specifics. The 
public notice function of patent claims is then furthered. With only 
one methodology used, different individuals more likely will inter-
pret the claims in the same manner, and thus, a higher likelihood 
of getting a similar result will exist. 280 Every methodology furthers 
certainty and uniformity to some degree if all the players in the 
patent system use the same methodology. 
Adopting a single methodology, however, does not automatically 
result in absolute certainty and uniformity. The methodology chosen 
can still be unpredictable in application because of the canons it 
chooses to use. This will frustrate the public notice function of 
patent claims. A methodology whose method cannot be reproduced 
uniformly creates a situation that is de facto like the situation in 
which a single methodology was never chosen.281 Thus, a certainty 
criterion may still be of some use to courts and commentators. An 
assumption is being made, however, that one methodology can lead 
to noticeably more certainty than others. 
This begs the question of whether any methodology can produce 
absolute certainty in claim meaning. That is, does a methodology 
exist where courts, patent holders, and patent observers will all 
come to the same definition for a particular claim term? Varying 
280. Some uncertainty can still exist if different individuals have difficulty implementing 
the chosen methodology in the same manner. In fact, depending on the methodology chosen, 
a significant amount of unpredictability may remain. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 
10, at 1176· 77. Others argue that the mere fact that claim interpretation is reviewed de novo 
creates substantial uncertainty for district court judges. See Phillips Ill, 2005 WL 1620331, 
at *22, *24-25 (Mayer, J. dissenting). Even under these circumstances, however, the results 
are still more certain because everyone is using the same approach, taking one variable out 
of the interpretation process. This variable removal at least moves closer to uniformity in 
result. 
281. The differential between the majority opinion in Phillips I and the en bane decision 
in Phillips III provides a good example of the uncertainty still present after a single 
methodology is adopted. See Phillips Ill, 2005 WL 1620331, at *20-21 (Lourie, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (noting the fact that the decisions reach different results with 
the same methodology). The same outcome-use of same methodology but different 
results--can also occur under the heavy presumption methodology. See, e.g., Nystrom v. Trex 
Co. 374 F.3d 1105, 1110-12 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (facing the possibility of different interpretations 
because of the multiple definitions of the term ''board" in different dictionaries). 
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degrees of certainty are obtainable,282 but, for certainty to be a 
successful criterion, a significant difference must exist between two 
methodologies for one to be clearly superior. Currently, commenta-
tors do not universally recognize a single methodology as achieving 
a significant degree of certainty and uniformity.283 At the least, a 
real question exists as to whether using certainty as a criterion adds 
anything to the evaluation process, particularly when true predict-
ability in claim interpretation may not be possible. 
Even if certainty helps distinguish some methodologies from 
others, this benefit must be compared against the criterion's failure 
to speak to the substantive function of patent claims. Ensuring the 
predictability of a claim interpretation methodology does not 
address whether the resulting substantive claim scope furthers the 
goals of patent law. Certainty may apprise everyone of the claim's 
scope of exclusivity, but it does not direct the scope of patent 
exclusivity in any given direction. A patent claim's substantive 
function is the most important role the claim plays in the patent 
system. 284 Any evaluation of interpretation methodology needs to 
consider the impact the approach has on the contours of the 
resulting patent scope. Such an impact is not considered when 
certainty is used as a criterion. Consequently, the criterion fails to 
judge methodologies on how they substantively affect patent scope. 
Nonetheless, certainty as a criterion should not be completely 
discounted. It should still be considered when examining differing 
approaches to defining claims. However, in view of its shortcomings, 
282. Leaving some uncertainty in the patent context may actually be beneficial. See, e.g., 
Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation 
Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 985 (1999). 
283. Most argue that the heavy presumption methodology is more predictable and certain 
than the specification methodology. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1176 
(discussing these two methodologies in the broader context of the holistic and procedural 
approach); Wang, supra note 215, at 169-71. However, just-as-convincing arguments exist that 
the heavy presumption methodology produces unpredictable results. See Hattenbach, supra 
note 276, at 189-90; Jennifer R. Johnson, Out of Context: Texas Digital, the Indefiniteness of 
Language, and the Search for Ordinary Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 532-40 (2004); Joseph Scott 
Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles & Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent 
Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 30-43), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=577262) (noting the many uncertainties introduced under the 
current use of dictionaries by the Federal Circuit). 
284. See infra Part IV.C.l. 
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particularly its ignorance of the patent claim's substantive function, 
other criteria must also be considered. 
IV. A NEW EvALUATION CRITERION: A METHODOLOGY'S CLAIM 
SCOPE PARADIGM 
This Article proposes the use of a new evaluation criterion-a 
claim interpretation methodology's "claim scope paradigm." A claim 
scope paradigm is the particular view, or perspective, on the proper 
patent scope encoded into an interpretation method. This view on 
patent scope can cause a methodology to consistently produce a 
specific type of patent protection. For example, a methodology may 
have a claim scope paradigm that consistently interprets claims to 
have a broad area of protection because the methodology's paradigm 
considers such broad protection to be correct. Another methodology 
may have a claim scope paradigm that always produces narrow 
claim interpretations.285 
Once a methodology's claim scope paradigm is identified, that 
particular approach's propriety can be judged based on the claim 
scope paradigm's acceptability. If a methodology's claim scope 
paradigm promotes a favored patent theory or policy, that methodol-
ogy scores well under this criterion. For example, if broad protection 
for the invention is favored, then a claim interpretation methodol-
ogy whose claim scope paradigm results in broad invention protec-
tion should be selected. In contrast, if courts or policymakers favor 
a narrow claim scope, an interpretation approach whose paradigm 
results in narrow protection should be adopted. The benefit to using 
claim scope paradigm as a criterion is that it speaks directly to the 
substantive function of patent claims. Claim scope paradigm ad-
dresses how a methodology affects patent protection, or in other 
words, the scope of exclusivity a patent claim creates. Once the 
claim scope paradigm is identified, courts can judge methodologies 
based on their substantive effect. 
285. This example overly simplifies the concept of claim scope paradigm and how a 
particular claim interpretation methodology can have and implement such a paradigm. Rarely 
is any patent theory as basic as supporting extremely broad patent scope or narrow patent 
scope. Most patent theories support a particular patent scope as it relates to other factors in 
the invention's technological industry or the invention itself. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 
1, at 1596-615 (cataloging and explaining different patent theories). 
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For a claim scope paradigm to be a viable criterion for evaluating 
methodologies, two points must be established. First, claim 
interpretation methodologies actually must contain Claim scope 
paradigms. If such paradigms are impossible to locate or identify, 
they cannot be used to evaluate methodologies. Second, some benefit 
to judging methodologies based on their claim scope paradigm must 
exist. Without some normative rationale for using claim scope 
paradigms as a criterion, the identification and comparison effort 
under the criterion is worthless and wasteful. This Part will explore 
each of these points in detail, concluding that claim scope paradigms 
do exist, are identifiable, and are extremely useful in grading a 
particular methodology and furthering patent theory. By identifying 
a methodology's claim scope paradigm, courts can recognize that 
choosing among interpretation methods is tied directly to choosing 
a proper patent scope. Afurther benefit is that the recognition of the 
claim scope paradigm facilitates the use of claim interpretation 
methodology as a highly effective patent policy lever. 
A. Identification of an Interpretation Methodology's Claim Scope 
Paradigm 
Most claim interpretation methodologies include a claim scope 
paradigm. The paradigm is encoded into the methodology through 
the particular interpretation canons that the methodology uses. 
Interpretation canons dictate how informational sources affect 
the resulting claim definition, and as the usage of the available 
informational sources change, so does the claim terms' definition. 
Using one interpretation canon may produce a particular claim 
definition, while using another on the same claim term can produce 
a different definition. The different definitions reflect a difference 
in patent scope. As a methodology is used in various cases, the 
methodology produces the same differential in claim scope in every 
case by using the same set of canons. This difference in the scope of 
patent protection is a direct product of the canon or canons that a 
methodology chooses to employ.286 The specific breadth of a claim's 
definition is the product of the defining process itself. This direct 
286. See Nard, supra note 57, at 4 ("Indeed, the interpretative tools used by a court directly 
affect the extent of the patentee's property interest, and, therefore, where the patentee's 
competitors may and may not tread."). 
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effect on claim definition in every case is a claim interpretation 
methodology's claim scope paradigm. 
To better illustrate the existence and identification of claim scope 
paradigms in interpretation methodologies, the two interpretation 
canons regarding the specification are revisited. 287 The former canon 
instructed the construer to read the claims in light of the specifica-
tion, while the latter cautioned the construer against reading 
limitations from the specification into the claims. Finding it difficult 
to implement both canons together, courts usually favor one canon 
over the other. Depending on which canon is emphasized, the 
specification has either significant or little to no influence on the 
resulting interpretation. 288 
By choosing one canon over the other, a methodology adopts a 
specific claim scope paradigm. The two canons speak to the 
relationship between the defined claim scope and the specification's 
teachings regarding the patentee's inventive activities. The former 
canon ensures the patentee's inventive activities influence the 
resulting definition, while the latter does not. If a methodology 
limits the resulting claim interpretation to the specification, that 
methodology constrains the patent's scope to the disclosed inven-
tion's specifics. In contrast, if a methodology allows a claim's 
meaning to deviate significantly from the specification, the disclosed 
invention information does not constrain the resulting claim scope. 
The specific claim language under construction does not produce the 
difference in claim scope under these two methodologies. Instead, 
the particular methodology that a canon employs directly produces 
the contours of the resulting claim scope in both cases. These 
characteristics of the resulting claim scope define a methodology's 
claim scope paradigm. To provide further examples of how a 
methodology can have an identifiable claim scope paradigm, the two 
recent approaches to claim interpretation will be examined. In 
addition, the Federal Circuit's recent analysis of these two ap-
proaches in Phillips III will be discussed. 
287. See supra Part II.B. 
288. This variation is demonstrated in Figure 2, supra p. 82. 
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1. Claim Scope Paradigm of the Specification Methodology 
The specification methodology, characterized by full and early use 
of the specification in the interpretation process, has an identifiable 
claim scope paradigm. The methodology's claim scope paradigm 
limits the patent's scope of protection to the full invention disclosed 
in the specification. This claim scope paradigm can be identified by 
examining the particular interpretation canons that the methodol-
ogy employs. In particular, to find the claim scope paradigm, the 
methodology is inspected to see the relationship it enforces between 
the resulting claim definition and other sources of invention-related 
information. 
In Phillips I, the majority used the specification methodology.289 
By looking at the specification early in the interpretation process, 
the majority focused on all the information about the invention and, 
specifically, the role the claimed ''baffles" played in the invention. 
The court looked to see how the inventor, in the context of the 
entirety of his invention, used the claim term ''baffles."290 Mter 
inspecting the specification, the court concluded that one of the core 
properties of the patentee's invention is the modular building 
walls' impact-resistant nature. 291 The patent called for the baffles' 
placement at an orientation other than ninety degrees to effectuate 
the invention's impact resistance.292 The patent's drawings support 
such a conclusion, depicting the baffles at an orientation other than 
ninety degrees. 293 The majority viewed the specification as describ-
ing the invention to include baffles with only an orientation other 
than ninety degrees.294 As the majority stated: "Inspection of the 
patent shows that baffles angled at other than 90° is the only 
embodiment disclosed in the patent; it is the invention. It is 
impossible to derive anything else from the specification."295 
289. Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips I), 363 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 
376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004} (en bane). 
290. Id. at 1213 (quoting Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp. 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998)). 
291. Id. 
292. Id. at 1213-14. 
293. Id. at 1213 (noting Figures 6 and 12 of U.S. Patent No. 4,677, 789 (flled Apr. 14, 1986) 
(issued July 7, 1987)). 
294. Id. at 1213-14. 
295. Id. at 1214. 
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The majority then took its.specification-based understanding of 
the patentee's invention-the impact-resistant features of the 
invention and the baffles' non-ninety degree orientation-and used 
it to interpret the claims. Accordingly, the court interpreted the 
claim term ''baffles" to mean baffles at an angular orientation to the 
outer shell other than ninety degrees. Following the specification 
methodology, the court determined the invention's parameters from 
the specification's teachings and interpreted the djsputed claim 
term in light of these teachings. More specifically, the court 
ensured that its interpretation of ''baffles" did not expand beyond 
the invention described in the specification.296 This approach has 
an identifiable claim scope paradigm, limiting claim scope to the 
disclosed invention. By using the specification fully and early in the 
interpretation process, the specification methodology limits the 
resulting claim scope to the specification's total teachings. Under 
the constraints encoded into the methodology, the term ''baffles" 
could not be given a meaning that expanded beyond the invention's 
scope disclosed in the specification.297 By allowing the specification 
to significantly influence the resulting claim's definition, the 
methodology, in turn, prevents the claim's literal scope from 
expanding beyond the patentee's inventive activities described in 
the specification. The methodology employs a claim scope paradigm 
that tunes the claim's meaning to what the patentee actually 
invented. 
The Federal Circuit, in Phillips III, came to the same conclusion 
regarding how the specification methodology impacts the contours 
of the resulting claim scope. 298 Although the court did not fully 
explore the specification methodology's claim scope paradigm, the 
Phillips III opinion laid a foundation for the paradigm's recognition. 
The court discussed the linkage between heavy reliance on the 
specification and characteristics of the interpreted claim. The court 
noted that by interpreting the claims "in the context of the par-
ticular patent" by using the full teachings of the specification, the 
296. Id. 
297. There can be disagreement, however, as to the scope of the disclosed invention. See, 
e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, at *17-*18 
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane) (coming to a different understanding than the majority in 
Phillips I as to the scope of the disclosed invention). 
298. See id. at *7-9 (discussing the specification's importance in claim interpretation and 
the determination of the patentee's invention). 
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resulting construction "is likely to capture the scope of the actual 
invention more accurately."299 
The same claim scope paradigm can be found in another Federal 
Circuit case, Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. America Online, Inc. 300 
In Wang, the court construed the term "frame" in a claim concern-
ing computer systems that displayed graphical and textual in-
formation.301 The claimed "frame" is the vehicle through which the 
invention's graphical and textual information is sent and 
processed.302 The patentee argued for the meaning of "frame" to 
include frames containing either bitmapped display information or 
character-based display information.303 The accused infringers 
asserted that "frame" should include only display systems that 
followed character-based protocols.304 The ordinary, plain meaning 
of term "frame," as generally used in the computer display arts, 
includes both bit and character systems. 305 
The court, following the specification methodology, first consulted 
the specification,306 looking at the specification to understand the 
patentee's invention. The court found that "[t]he only system that 
[was] described and enabled in the [patent's] specification and 
drawings used a character-based protocol."307 The court did not find 
any description in the specification of other types of display 
protocols, including bit-based systems.308 Based on its analysis, the 
court concluded that "the specification would not be so understood 
by a person skilled in the field of the invention" to teach such a 
person how to use frames containing bitmapped display informa-
tion.309 
299. See id. at *16 (noting that by using the full teachings of the specification, the resulting 
interpretation will both properly use the specification's information but not improperly limit 
the claims to the disclosed embodiments). 
300. 197 F.3d 1377, 1381·83 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Wang is cited by Wagner and Petherbridge 
as the exemplar for the holistic approach to claim interpretation. See Wagner & Petherbridge, 
supra note 10, at 1135·36. 
301. Wang, 197 F.3d at 1379·80. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. at 1381. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. (deriving the "general usage" of the term "frame" from the testimony and the 
parties' stipulations). 
306. Id. at 1382·83. 
307. Id. at 1382 (basing its conclusion on both the specification's text and drawings). 
308. Id. 
309. Id. 
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Once the court in Wang understood the extent of the specifica-
tion's teachings about the invention to those skilled in the art, it 
applied this understanding to its construction of the claim term at 
issue. Thus, the term "frame" was interpreted to include only frames 
containing character-based display information.310 The defined 
claim was not allowed to expand beyond what the court understood 
as the patented invention. The court noted that the claims may be 
interpreted beyond the preferred embodiment, but they may not 
encompass subject matter beyond the disclosed invention or, in 
other words, what the specification described and taught. 311 
The Wang court's approach is similar to the approach of the 
court in Phillips III and the majority's approach in Phillips I. The 
claim interpretation methodology employed in Wang examines the 
specification early in the interpretation process and uses its com-
plete teachings. As in Phillips III and Phillips I, the Wang court 
ensured that the interpreted claims did not exceed the invention 
described and enabled in the specification. 312 The specification 
methodology's full and early use limits the scope of the claims to the 
invention the patent teaches. 313 The patent's disclosure sets a ceiling 
for the claim's meaning, and thus, the literal scope of exclusivity 
afforded to the patent. By setting this limit, the methodology used 
in Wang implements the same claim scope paradigm adopted in 
Phillips III and used in the majority's decision in Phillips I, which 
limited the resulting claim scope to the disclosed invention. A single 
claim scope paradigm for the specification methodology, therefore, 
clearly exists and is identifiable. Figure 3, below, modifies Figure 1 
to demonstrate the claim scope paradigm implemented through the 
specification methodology. 314 
310. Id. at 1382-83. 
311. Id. at 1383 (noting that interpreting claims beyond the preferred embodiment is "a 
question specific to the content of the specification, the context in which the embodiment is 
described, the prosecution history, and if appropriate the prior art"). 
312. Id. 
313. Id.; see Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips 1), 363 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 
vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane). 
314. Figure 3 depicts the maximum claim meaning under the specification methodology. 
The specification methodology can result in a claim meaning that is narrower than the 
specification's constructive teachings. That is, a patentee may choose to claim less than the 
full invention described and enabled in the specification for reasons of maintaining validity. 














2. Claim Scope Paradigm of the Heavy Presumption 
Methodology 
The heavy presumption methodology, which uses a heavy 
presumption in favor of dictionary definitions over the specification, 
implements a different claim scope paradigm. The methodology's 
claim scope paradigm does not limit the claim interpretation to the 
specification's teachings. Instead, the claim scope paradigm that the 
heavy presumption methodology employs only loosely ties the 
claim's definition, if at all, to the disclosed invention. 
The dissent in Phillips I provides a good example of the heavy 
presumption methodology's claim scope paradigm. In particular, the 
dissent's discussion demonstrates the disconnect that the heavy 
presumption methodology creates between a claim's meaning and 
the specification's teaching.315 The dissent, following the heavy 
315. Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1216-19 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part). 
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presumption methodology, used a dictionary initially to obtain the 
claim term's ordinary meaning under dispute.316 Once the ordinary 
meaning is determined, the heavy presumption takes effect and can 
only be overcome in limited circumstances.317 
Evidence to overcome the presumption can be found in the 
specification, but it must come in the form of affirmative statements 
limiting the claim term at issue, such as limiting ''baffles" to a 
particular angular orientation.318 Notably, the dissent did not ask 
what invention the specification describes or whether the specifica-
tion supported the full range of''baffles" encompassed in the term's 
ordinary meaning.319 No inquiry was made as to whether the 
patentee invented a ninety degree baffle, and accordingly, whether 
it was described and enabled in the specification. The dissent found 
nothing to rebut the heavy presumption and therefore adopted the 
ordinary meaning of''baffles" obtained from a dictionary. 320 
The heavy presumption methodology contains its own identifiable 
claim scope paradigm, which disassociates claim scope from the 
disclosed invention. The specification's teachings do not tie down a 
claim's definition under this claim scope paradigm. By first looking 
for a claim term's ordinary meaning in an external definitional 
source, the methodology can produce claim meanings unrelated to 
the invention described in the specification. The heavy presumption 
methodology then makes only minimal efforts to relink the claim's 
definition. with the specification's teachings. At best, a loose 
relationship is created in those limited circumstances where the 
heavy presumption is overcome and information from the specifica-
tion influences the claim's definition. In most cases, the invention-
related information in the specification plays no role in the 
definitional process. Consequently, the methodology's claim scope 
paradigm produces a patent scope unbounded by the patentee's 
specific inventive activities. 
316. Id. at 1216-17 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part). 
317. Id. at 1217 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part) (finding no support for adding additional 
structural limitations to the ordinary meaning of ''baffies"). 
318. I d. at 1217-18 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part) (noting that "[t]he specification of the '798 
patent contains no such language clearly limiting the claims to a specific structure"). 
319. Id.; cf Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1213-14 (demonstrating how the majority examined the 
specification for a description of the invention). 
320. Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1219 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part). 
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The Federal Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Phillips 111.321 
Again, as with its discussion of the specification methodology, the 
court did not fully analyze the heavy presumption methodology's 
claim scope paradigm. But its discussion regarding the claim scope 
the methodology produces is a significant step in this paradigm's 
recognition. The court viewed the heavy presumption methodology 
as disconnecting the patent's teachings regarding the invention 
and the claims' ultimate construction.322 The methodology's ''heavy 
reliance on the dictionary divorced from the intrinsic evidence risks 
transforming the meaning of the claim term to the artisan into the 
meaning of the term in the abstract, out of its particular context, 
which is the specification."323 
The majority's decision in SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enter-
prises, Inc. 324 provides another example of this claim scope para-
digm. The patents at issue in SuperGuide laid claim to on-screen, 
interactive programming· guides for televisions.325 The earliest 
patent at issue, U.S. Patent No. 4,751,578, was filed in May 1985 
and issued in 1988.326 The patent's specification teaches how to use 
its invention to mix the on-screen programming guide information 
with television signals received via antenna or cable so that both 
could be displayed simultaneously on the television. 327 The first 
claim in the patent describes a "mixer" element "for mixing a 
regularly received television signal with the signal generated by the 
microcontroller" to create the on-screen guide.328 
In June 2000, SuperGuide sued a group of satellite television 
providers.329 Notably, the accused devices, all set-top boxes that 
receive broadcast satellite transmissions, received digital television 
signal transmissions to be displayed on a satellite subscriber's 
321. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286,2005 WL 1620331, at 
*15 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane). 
322. See id. at *13-15. 
323. Id. at *14. The court concludes that the heavy presumption methodology ''will 
systematically cause the construction of the claim to be unduly expansive." Id. 
324. 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
325. Id. at 875-76. 
326. Id. at 875. 
327. Id. at 875-76 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,751,578 (filed May 28, 1985) (issued June 14, 
1988)). 
328. Id. at 876 (emphasis removed) (quoting U.S. Patent No.4, 751,578 (filed May 28, 1985) 
(issued June 14, 1988)). 
329. Id. at 873-74. 
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television.330 The defendants' main argument was that the first 
claim in the patent, and certain other claims SuperGuide asserted, 
required the mixing of analog television signals with the on-screen 
guide and therefore did not cover digital televisions signals.331 
The majority reversed the district court's interpretation and 
concluded that the claim term "television signals" includes all 
television signals, regardless of their format. 332 The majority used 
the heavy presumption methodology to arrive at their claim 
interpretation.333 The court first looked at the ordinary meaning of 
the claim term "television signal," determining that it did not limit 
the type of television signal, and therefore, an analog limitation was 
inappropriate.334 The court further noted that "neither 'analog' nor 
'digital' appears in any of the asserted claims."335 The ordinary 
meaning of the claim term was set. 
The majority then turned to the specification, but only to 
determine whether the heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary 
meaning was overcome. It found nothing in the specification 
demonstrating that the patentee explicitly acted as his own 
lexicographer or disclaimed any part of the ordinary meaning.336 
Nowhere did the patentee "explicitly limit the disputed claim 
language" to analog signals.337 Nor was there anything "in the 
written description ... that precludes ... the claimed invention from 
receiving video data in digital format."338 The majority concluded 
that the heavy presumption was not overcome and the claim 
language's plain meaning supported the broad definition of 
"television signal."339 
330. Id. at 873. 
331. Id. at 876-77. 
332. Id. at 879-80. 
333. Id. 
334. ld. at 878-80 (''The claim language does not limit the disputed phrases to any 
particular type of technology or specify a particular type of signal format, such as analog or 
digital."). 
335. Id. at 878. 
336. I d. at 879-80 (indicating that the court found "nothing in the written description of the 
'578 patent, much less the claim language, that precludes the mixer of the claimed invention 
from receiving video data in digital format"). 
337. I d. (noting further that "[h]ad the patentees intended to limit the disputed claim terms 
to 'analog' technology, they could have easily done so by explicitly modifying the disputed 
claim language with the term 'analog"') (emphasis added). 
338. Id. at 880 (emphasis added). 
339. Id. ("We find no reason here to limit the scope of the claimed invention to analog 
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As in the dissent's opinion in Phillips I, the heavy presumption 
methodology used in SuperGuide disconnects the resulting claim 
scope from the specification's teachings about the patentee's 
invention. Consequently, the scope of patent protection can extend 
well beyond the patentee's actual invention. This claim scope 
paradigm takes effect through the methodology's presumption that 
the disclosed invention's specifics does not restrain the patent's 
scope. 
The resulting claim scope in SuperGuide included all television 
signals, even though the specification focused on mixing a program-
ming guide with analog signals. 340 In fact, digital television signals 
were not broadcast until well after the patent's filing. 341 A person 
skilled in the art at the time of the patent's filing would not have 
understood, based on the patent, that the on-screen guide invention 
was to be used with what were at that time nonexistent digital 
television signals.342 As the concurrence stated, "[t]he majority's 
claim constructions expand the scope of the '578 patent far beyond 
what the named inventors say they actually invented in their 
application, and what it describes and enables."343 ''The inventors 
here most assuredly did not invent a system that receives digital 
signals; their patent cannot therefore cover such systems."344 
Other interpretation canons exist that may reign in the resulting 
interpretation, bringing it closer to the specification's teachings on 
the invention.345 However, under the current heavy presumption 
technology, when 'regularly received television signals,' i.e., video data, is broad enough to 
encompass both formats and those skilled in the art knew both formats could be used for 
video."). 
340. See id. at 896-98 (Michel, J., concurring) (stating that the patent did not describe or 
enable "systems for receiving signal technology that was not then in use by the television 
industry"). 
341. ld. at 897 (Michel, J., concurring) (citing expert testimony that digital television 
signals were not in use when the patent was filed in 1985). 
342. ld. at 896-98 (Michel, J., concurring) (citing testimony). 
343. ld. at 896 (Michel, J., concurring). 
344. ld. at 898 (Michel, J., concurring). 
345. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J., 
concurring) (noting that patent protection cannot extend beyond what "the applicant has 
actually conceived and enabled"); Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(demonstrating that the canon of interpretation dictating that claims must be interpreted as 
valid prevents a resulting claim definition from going beyond the specification's teachings); 
SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting 
that patent doctrine requires claims to have the same meaning for purposes of determining 
validity and infringement). 
114 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:49 
methodology, these canons rarely take hold. Using a heavy pre-
sumption in favor of dictionary definitions ensures that courts first 
reference outside sources, not the specification.346 Once the ordinary 
meaning is determined from a dictionary, the heavy presumption 
entrenches this meaning. 347 The presumption can be overcome only 
under limited circumstances in which the specification affirmatively 
teaches away from the ordinary meaning. The heavy presumption 
methodology does not provide an opportunity to check for complete 
continuity between the claims and the specification.348 The dissent 
in Phillips I and the majority in SuperGuide provide excellent 
examples of this phenomenon, as those opinions never spoke to 
whether the claims, as interpreted, were valid, or whether the 
specification fully supported the breadth of the presumed ordinary 
claim meaning.349 Instead, the methodology views the specification 
as only limiting, as opposed to supporting, the claim's definition. As 
the court in Phillips III characterized it, the methodology starts 
with the dictionary definition and only then starts "whittling it 
down."350 · 
Therefore, the heavy presumption methodology's claim scope 
paradigm is de facto erratic relative to the specification's teachings 
regarding the invention. The methodology moves the claim term's 
meaning from the context of the patent to the abstract.351 This 
erratic nature results from the methodology's inability to establish 
a fixed relationship between the defined claim and the disclosed 
invention. Figure 4, below, modifies Figure 1 to depict a potential 
claim scope under the heavy presumption methodology. Because the 
346. See Wang, supra note 215, at 165-69. 
347. See id. 
348. In certain cases, the court, following the heavy presumption methodology, considered 
whether the interpreted claim met the specification requirements. See Johnson Worldwide 
Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (ensuring that the written 
description requirement is met). In Johnson, however, the court did not inquire into the 
specification requirements on its own volition, but rather it was prompted to do so by the 
defendant's arguments. ld. (referencing Zebco's argument). 
349. The parties' arguments could have dictated this fact. However, both decisions 
demonstrate that checks to link the interpreted claims and the specification are not an 
inherent part of the heavy presumption methodology. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips I), 
363 F.3d 1207, 1216-19 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J., dissenting in part); SuperGuide Corp. v. 
DirectTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 878-80 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
350. Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, at *14 
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane). 
351. See id. 
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resulting claim scope is tied only loosely to the patent's specification, 
the claim scope can potentially expand well beyond the specification 
















B. Evaluating Claim Interpretation Methodologies Based on Their 
Claim Scope Paradigm 
The examples above demonstrate that claim scope paradigms do 
exist in claim interpretation methodologies and that they are 
identifiable. The next step involves using this new criterion to 
evaluate claim interpretation methodologies. Evaluation simply 
352. See, e.g., K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1362-65 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (adopting 
an ordinary meaning of"permanently affixed" under the heavy presumption methodology that 
yielded a narrower claim scope by excluding attachment via a screw). This contradicts the 
Federal Circuit's assumption that the heavy presumption methodology will "systematically 
cause the construction of the claim to be unduly expansive." See Phillips III, 2005 WL 
1620331, at *14. 
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requires determining what claim scope paradigm the evaluator 
wishes to further. 353 Once this is established, the different methodol-
ogies are examined to determine whether they possess the favored 
claim scope paradigm. To score well under this criterion, a method-
ology needs to implement, or at least come close to implementing, 
the preferred claim scope paradigm. 
A major difference between claim scope paradigm and certainty 
as a criterion is that only one general concept of certainty354 exists 
while there are many claim scope paradigms. To actually perform 
the evaluation process under the claim scope paradigm criterion, the 
specific paradigm sought must first be chosen. This choice involves 
a normative determination, asking what is the optimal claim scope? 
The answer to this question is beyond this Article's scope.355 
However, the two recent methodologies' claim scope paradigms 
can be reexamined to see what patent theory an evaluator would 
need to support for that methodology to score well under this 
criterion. Put another way, each methodology's claim scope para-
digm can be further analyzed to determine what patent protection 
theory the paradigm furthers. With this understanding, scoring 
methodologies under the claim scope criterion is easier. If a 
methodology creates claim definitions that further the evaluator's 
theory regarding the proper patent scope, presumably the same 
evaluator will prefer that methodology. 
353. The Federal Circuit failed to perform this step in Phillips III. See generally Phillips 
III, 2005 WL 1620331, at *14. Although it may be implied from its favoring of the specification 
methodology, the court does not identify the particular patent theory it is trying to effectuate. 
Such a failure to identify the preferred patent theory is not surprising, considering the 
Federal Circuit historically has shown a lack of interest in patent law scholarship. See Craig 
Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of Scholarship in Federal 
Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 Hous. L. REV. 667, 678-81 (2002) (demonstrating that 
scholarship is rarely cited by the Federal Circuit). 
354. However, varying degrees of certainty can exist. 
355. Other commentators, however, have answered the question, but not surprisingly, their 
answers are not the same. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for 
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) (arguing that patent rights should 
be afforded the same scope as property rights); Edmund W. Kitch, supra note 6 (calling for 
patent scope to take into account the prospect theory of patent rights); Merges & Nelson, 
supra note 1 (favoring reduced patent scope to encourage competition). 
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1. Competitive Innovation Theory Supports the Selection of the 
Specification Methodology 
The specification methodology's claim scope paradigm creates a 
patent scope limited by the disclosed invention. This methodology 
uses this paradigm to achieve its goal of interpreting claims to 
encompass what the patentee actually invented. This claim scope 
paradigm most closely implements the "competitive innovation" 
patent theory.356 The specification methodology, by limiting the 
interpreted claim scope to the patentee's inventive activities, tries 
to facilitate competition in the marketplace, as opposed to giving the 
patentee near-monopoly power.357 The specification methodology 
would therefore score well under the claim scope paradigm criterion 
if an evaluator looks for a methodology that furthers the competitive 
innovation theory of patents. 
The competitive innovation patent theory asserts that patents are 
needed only to provide an incentive to invent?58 According to this 
approach, patent protection is needed primarily to overcome the 
public good nature of intellectual property.359 With patent protec-
tion, the potential inventor has some assurance that others can be 
prevented from copying the invention. 360 Therefore, the investor has 
356. The label "competitive innovation" as used to describe the following theory is taken 
from Burk and Lemley's recent work on patent policy levers. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 
1, at 1604. 
357. Id. at 1604-07 (explaining the competitive innovation theory). 
358. Id. at 1605-07. 
359. See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for 
Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 667, 680-81 (2004) (discussing the "free rider 
problem" that the public good nature of invention creates and how it "undercut[s] the 
incentive to invent"); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use 
and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 104-05 (2004) (''The production of patentable 
inventions is understood to be different from other commercial activity because the 
investment in new ideas, unlike the investment in capital equipment or materials, is assumed 
to be appropriable by competitors at very little expense."); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 
1, at 1605 (indicating that "information is a public good for which consumption is 
nonrivalrous-that is, one person's use of the information does not deprive others of the 
ability to use it"). 
360. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of 
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1466-67 (2002). Parchomovsky and Siegelman 
argue that: 
[A]bsent legal protection, competitors would copy such works without incurring 
the initial costs of producing them. Unauthorized reproduction would drive down 
the market price to the cost of copying, original authors and inventors would not 
be able to recover their expenditures on authorship and R&D, and, as a result, 
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a potential to recoup research and development costs, thereby 
creating an incentive to invent. 361 The competitive innovation theory 
views patents as providing only an ex ante incentive to create the 
invention. 362 
After the invention's creation, the competitive innovation theory 
argues that competition, not monopoly power, provides the best way 
to encourage actual innovation in the marketplace.363 Patent law 
and exclusivity is no longer needed to prompt the inventor to 
further develop and commercialize the invention.364 Competition will 
provide enough ex post incentive after the invention's creation to 
stimulate its development and improvement, and to make it 
commercially viable and beneficial.365 Companies will innovate to 
too few inventions and expressive works would be created. 
Id. at 1467. 
361. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974) (''The patent laws 
promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to 
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development."); 
Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1605; Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in 
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 995-96 (1997) (noting that by giving the 
inventor "control over the use and distribution of their ideas," intellectual property law 
"encourage[s] them to invest efficiently in the production of new ideas and works of 
authorship"). 
362. See Mark. A. Lemley, supra note 5, at 129-30. 
363. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1605-07 (citing the telecommunications industry 
as an empirical example). Innovation is the combination of invention and investment, in 
which "invention of itself produces no economic effect, while patent-based innovation has a 
positive impact on the economic system as new industries and new goods displace the old." 
Hilton Davis Chern. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1529 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(Newman, J., concurring) (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950)). 
364. The competitive innovation theory stands in sharp contrast to ex post justifications 
for patent law, such as the prospect theory, where patent protection is seen as crucial to 
development and commercialization ofthe invention. See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, 
Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305 (1992) (reftning the prospect theory by 
focusing on rent dissipation in patent law); Kieff, supra note 355 (articulating the 
commercialization theory of patent law); Kitch, supra note 6, at 276-78 (describing the 
prospect theory of patents); Lemley, supra note 5, at 130-31. 
365. Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1604-07 (noting that ''Ken Arrow has argued that 
competition, not monopoly, best spurs innovation because, to simplify greatly, companies in 
a competitive marketplace will innovate in order to avoid losing, while monopolists can afford 
to be lazy") (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Research for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 619-20 (Nat'l Bureau of 
Econ. Researched. 1962)). 
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avoid losing their market position, and therefore, monopolists will 
be unable to remain dormant. 366 
The competitive innovation theory advocates a narrow scope for 
patent rights. Patents should protect only particular ways to 
compete in the marketplace; they should not give patent holders 
complete monopolies. 367 The competitive innovation theory argues 
for patents to give less than perfect monopoly control of the 
market. 368 Therefore, the competitive innovation theory suggests a 
narrow patent scope as the best way to ensure this imperfect 
control. 369 
The specification methodology can be viewed as implementing a 
competitive innovation patent theory through its claim scope 
paradigm. The resulting claim scope under the approach is tailored 
to. the patentee's invention.370 More specifically, the range of the 
invention's embodiments that the specification teaches to one skilled 
in the art limits the literal scope of the claims. Consequently, the 
patentee does not gain control over every implementation of the 
invention unless the specification teaches every implementation. 
The patentee gets enough protection to exclude others from copying 
the patentee's exact work, but not such broad protection as would 
likely give the patentee monopoly power. 
The specification methodology, however, does not perfectly 
implement the competitive innovation· patent theory. The resulting 
claim scope goes further than the specific embodiments described in 
the specification. 371 The competitive innovation theory requires 
patents to ''be narrowly circumscribed to particular implementations 
of an invention, and ... generally [does] not give the patentee the 
366. See id. at 1604. 
367. Id. at 1605-07. 
368. Id. 
369. Id. at 1607 ("Competition advocates would argue that, at the very least, patent rights 
should be narrow and should give less than perfect monopoly control."). 
370. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips III), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, *16 
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane) (indicating that the specification methodology "is likely to 
capture the scope of the actual invention more accurately" than other methodologies). 
371. See id. at *16 (noting that "it is important to keep in mind that the purposes of the 
specification are to teach and enable those of skill in the art to make and use the invention"); 
Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1379-82 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (looking at the 
specification to determine what someone skilled in the art would understand to be the 
disclosed invention's scope); see also supra notes 307-12 and accompanying text; Figure 3, 
supra p. 109. 
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right to control competition in an economic market."372 The specifica-
tion methodology gives more protection than that, limiting claim 
scope to the constructive specification rather than the specification's 
literal teachings. The methodology allows the claim scope to extend 
to the invention's embodiments that one skilled in the art would 
think of, not just those that the patentee specifically considered. 
Additionally, the methodology does not consider the patent's actual 
industry or whether the resulting claim scope will or will not give 
the patentee monopoly control. Instead, the methodology focuses on 
the patent document and the teachings on the invention. 
The specification methodology's claim scope paradigm is still close 
to implementing, at the least, what can be considered a "modified" 
form of the competitive innovation theory.373 The claim scope 
paradigm gives the patentee protection broader than the specific 
embodiments, but still limited to those embodiments constructively 
disclosed in the specification.374 Thus, if an evaluator wants to 
further the competitive innovation theory of patent protection, the 
specification methodology should be selected. The specification 
methodology's claim scope paradigm creates claim definitions that 
372. Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1605. 
373. See Figure 2, supra p. 34. The specification methodology's implementation of a 
modified competitive innovation theory appears to be similar to a middle ground patent scope 
that Duffy identified in his work critiquing the prospect theory. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking 
the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. Cm. L. REV. 439, 499-500 (2004). As Duffy describes it: 
!d. 
A very narrow definition of patent rights-for example, covering only that 
particular laser-can be rejected because such narrowly defined rights will not 
allow the inventor to capture the benefits of investments in developing the laser. 
In other words, the investments to develop the laser will have enormous 
spillover effects because of the narrow definition of the patentee's property 
rights. The choice between a particular class of lasers and all lasers is more 
difficult. The issue should turn on whether the broader rights are necessary to 
protect the investments that have been made in inventing, and that will be 
made in developing, the patentee's particular laser. If the patent has that scope, 
then broadening the patent further is unnecessary. 
37 4. In contrast, the specification methodology's claim scope paradigm does not implement 
the cumulative innovation patent theory. The cumulative innovation theory, as Merges and 
Nelson formulated, tailors patent scope to provide adequate incentives to initial inventors, 
while not deterring subsequent improvers. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 876-79; see 
also Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1607-08 (using the phrase "cumulative innovation"). The 
specification methodology employs no such tailoring, ignoring whether an invention is a 
pioneer, an initial invention in a field, or an improvement. Additionally, when interpreting 
a claim, the specification methodology does not inquire about what effect the resulting claim 
scope will have on follow-up inventions. 
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come close to implementing the competitive innovation theory. Its 
claim scope paradigm would score well under this patent theory. 
2. Prospect Theory (Possibly) Supports the Selection of the 
Heavy Presumption Methodology 
In contrast, the heavy presumption methodology does not 
necessarily score well under any particular patent theory. The 
methodology's claim scope paradigm produces a patent scope that 
is connected only loosely to the specification's teachings. The heavy 
presumption methodology focuses almost entirely on simply giving 
the patent claims their ordinarily understood meanings. The 
methodology's claim scope paradigm shows little concern for 
whether the resulting patent scope relates to the patentee's 
inventive activities. 375 The paradigm's inability to produce a definite 
relationship between the patent's scope and the described invention 
hampers any association the methodology can have with a specific 
patent theory. 
The extent of the heavy presumption methodology's ability to 
implement the prospect theory of patents provides a good example. 
The methodology arguably implements the prospect theory. By not 
limiting the patent scope to the specification's specific embodi-
ments,376 the methodology potentially creates a range of exclusivity 
far greater than the patentee's specific implementation of the 
invention. The methodology may give the patentee the greatest 
375. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286,2005 WL 1620331, at 
*14 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane) (noting how the heavy presumption methodology 
results in interpretations that are abstract from, and out of context with, the disclosed 
invention); Rousey Pharm. v. Astrazeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that the heavy "presumption dissociates the term from the 
invention described, enabled, and prosecuted by the inventor, and places an unnecessary 
burden on the inventor who wants simply to restore the meaning that the inventor and the 
examiner, and others in the field of the invention, clearly understand"); SuperGuide Corp. v. 
DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Michel, J., concurring) (indicating 
that the current trend emphasizing ordinary meaning "compromises two fundamental tenets 
of the patent system: first, that the applicant must be the 'inventor' of the things covered by 
the patent claims, and second, that the right to exclude will be no broader than the inventor's 
enabling disclosure"). 
376. See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see 
also Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[T]his court has 
expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the 
claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment."). 
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possible breadth of patent protection because dictionary definitions 
provide the methodology's only substantive limitation on patent 
scope.377 Mfording a patent broad protection well beyond the 
patente_e's specific embodiments may give the patent holder the 
necessary protection to successfully commercialize and improve 
upon the invention, and thus it may further the pros-pect theory. 
The prospect theory that Kitch developed contends that a patent 
functions as a "prospect," encouraging the invention's further 
development and commercialization. 378 Patent protection is viewed 
as providing ex post incentives to prompt the patented invention's 
efficient maturity.379 By giving the patentee exclusive control over 
her prospect, the patentee ''has an incentive to make investments to 
maximize the patent's value without fear that the fruits of the 
investment will produce unpatentable information that competitors 
can appropriate."380 Under this theory, patent law provides the 
patentee ''breathing room" to develop, market, and improve upon 
the invention without interference from others. 381 In addition, 
patent protection allows the patentee to coordinate any development 
or improvement through licensing.382 The prospect theory argues 
that "technological information is a resource which will not be used 
efficiently absent exclusive ownership," and patent law provides this 
exclusive ownership. 383 
The prospect theory, therefore, implies necessarily that patent 
law should provide an inventor with a broad patent scope. The 
patent must not only provide exclusivity over the invention, but also 
exclusivity over the complete prospect surrounding the invention. 384 
Patent law must give the patentee broad patent protection covering 
377. See Phillips Ill, 2005 WL 1620331, at *14-15 (concluding that the heavy presumption 
methodology will "systematically cause the construction of the claim to be unduly expansive"); 
SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 898 (Michel, J., concurring) (indicating that "[t]he ultimate result of 
this trend is claim constructions providing the broadest possible scope to claim terms, absent 
express limiting language in the claim, specification or prosecution history, but regardless of 
what the inventors actually invented"). 
378. See Kitch, supra note 6, at 265, 276, 285-86; see also Duffy, supra note 373, at 440-42. 
379. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1601 (noting that prospect theory views the 
patent system as providing no incentive to invent, but rather "giving exclusive rights to 
successful inventors in order to encourage future invention"); Lemley, supra note 5, at 132-33. 
380. Kitch, supra note 6, at 276. 
381. See id. at 276-77; see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 871. 
382. See Kitch, supra note 6, at 279; see a.Zso Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 871. 
383. Kitch, supra note 6, at 276; see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1601-03. 
384. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1603-04. 
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the "matrix of technological possibilities" regarding the invention, 
including its commercial embodiments and potential improve-
ments.385 This broad protection creates the ex post incentive to 
develop the invention because it makes the patentee the sole 
controller of the invention's development or improvement.386 
The heavy presumption methodology, although having the poten-
tial to create broad protection, does not stay true to the prospect 
theory. In most cases, its claim scope paradigm does not tune the 
resulting patent scope to any other aspect of the patent, the 
invention, or the technology underlying the patent. 387 A claim's 
definition under this methodology is not linked necessarily to the 
patentee's inventive activities, and the prospect theory is focused on 
such activities.388 Thus, this claim scope paradigm cannot ensure 
that the patentee will have the protection necessary to facilitate 
coordination of the invention's development and improvement. The 
heavy presumption methodology can create a claim scope that fails 
to protect aspects of the invention altogether.389 
This potential for the defined claim scope to be dissociated from 
the patentee's invention frustrates the heavy presumption methodol-
ogy's ability to implement any particular patent theory. Almost all 
patent theories are centered, in some way, around the patentee's 
actual inventive activities. The competitive innovation theory 
suggests patent protection that is tailored closely to the patentee's 
inventive activities.390 The prospect theory, in contrast, supports 
patent scope that provides broad protection for what the patentee 
has actually developed. 391 Other theories, such as the cumulative 
innovation theory, are also tuned to the patentee's invention.392 
385. See Kitch, supra note 6, at 271. "A prospect theory therefore suggests that patents 
should be granted early in the invention process, and should have broad scope and few 
exceptions." Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1604. 
386. See Kitch, supra note 6, at 275-79. 
387. See Figure 4, supra p. 115. 
388. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, at 
*14-17 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane) (concluding that under this methodology, the 
resulting construction is "abstract" and "out of [the) particular context" of the patentee's 
disclosed invention); Kitch, supra note 6, at 276-77. 
389. See, e.g., K-2 Corp. v. Salomon SA., 191 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
390. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1607. 
391. See Kitch, supra note 6, at 275-79. 
392. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1607-10; Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 876-
79. 
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Thus, only an evaluator who subscribed to the prospect theory 
would possibly favor the heavy presumption methodology. The 
methodology's claim scope paradigm can result in a broad claim 
scope, falling in line with the prospect theory, though the claim 
scope paradigm's inability to fix patent scope to the patentee's 
invention in some manner prevents it from successfully implement-
ing the prospect theory. 
C. Benefits to Using Claim Scope Paradigm as a Criterion 
The benefits to using claim scope paradigm as a criterion are 
twofold. First, using this criterion ensures that the effect that a 
methodology has on the patent claim's substantive function is taken 
into account. Interpretation methodologies, as demonstrated, clearly 
impact the extent of patent protection. By using a claim scope 
paradigm in the methodology evaluation process, this impact can be 
recognized and methodologies can be evaluated as to whether they 
produce a favorable claim scope. Second, identifying the claim scope 
paradigm allows methodologies to become highly effective patent 
policy levers. The discretion and direct effect that a methodology has 
on a patent scope makes it a perfect tool for adjusting and interject-
ing policy and theory into the patent system. 
1. Claim Scope Paradigm Addresses a Methodology's Effect on 
the Substantive Function of Patent Claims 
The main benefit to using claim scope paradigm as an evaluation 
criterion is that it addresses a methodology's effect on the main 
function of patent claims-substantively defining patent scope. A 
methodology's claim scope paradigm discloses the impact that the 
methodology will have on the specifics of claim scope. This result 
has been demonstrated already for the two recent interpretation 
methodologies. By identifying its claim scope paradigm, one can now 
see that the specification methodology produces a claim scope that 
is tailored to the fully disclosed invention. The claim scope paradigm 
in the heavy presumption methodology shows that the methodology 
will result in a claim scope that is tied only loosely to the patentee's 
invention. By identifying each methodology's claim scope paradigm, 
one can tell how that methodology will impact the scope of patent 
protection that the defined claim will give. 
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The full impact of a claim interpretation methodology on the 
patent claim's substantive function can then be properly assessed. 
Claims are interpreted to answer fundamental patent questions, 
such as which product or processes the patent holder may exclude 
and whether the patent's scope of exclusivity is valid and, therefore, 
protectable. Because a claim scope paradigm exists, the methodol-
ogy chosen has a direct impact on the answers to these questions. 
By recognizing a methodology's claim scope paradigm, courts can 
confront a methodology's role in shaping the substantive function of 
patent claims. Courts can then evaluate methodologies based on 
how the methodologies influence the basic patent issues of infringe-
ment and validity. Methodologies can be chosen that produce a 
desired claim scope or, at the least, do not frustrate patent policy. 
The claim scope paradigm criterion recognizes the normative 
features of claim interpretation methodologies. The criterion speaks 
to the substantive aspect of patent claims, an aspect that the 
certainty criterion fails to address. That being said, using the claim 
scope paradigm as a benchmark does not mean that the certainty 
criterion must be discarded. The two criteria can be used in 
tandem.393 In no way does the introduction of the claim scope 
paradigm criterion mean that methodologies should never be 
examined as to their predictability. A claim interpretation method-
ology can be evaluated under both criteria, and methodologies can 
be considered as to how well they score under each standard. Use of 
both criteria in the evaluation process is depicted graphically in 
Figure 5 below. 
393. One commentator has collectively used multiple criteria to judge interpretation 
methodologies. See Nard, supra note 57, at 35·43, 65-82 (using certainty, institutional 
competence, and a methodology's effect on ex post innovation as criteria to evaluate a 
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The more certainty that a methodology produces in defining 
claims, the better it scores under that criterion and the further up 
the vertical axis it moves in Figure 5. Methodologies that create 
some certainty-"positiv~" certainty-as to the resulting definition 
are plotted in the positive regions on the vertical axis in either 
quadrant I or II. A similar analysis is performed for the methodol-
ogy's claim scope paradigm. The greater the success that the 
methodology's claim scope paradigm has in implementing what is 
considered the proper claim scope, the better the methodology scores 
under the claim scope paradigm standard. The result of this 
evaluation is graphed relative to the horizontal axis in Figure 5. 
Again, as with the certainty criterion, a methodology's claim scope 
paradigm may frustrate the preferred patent scope's implementa-
tion, and thus score poorly. 394 Methodologies in which the claim 
394. A good example of this situation would be the evaluation of the heavy presumption 
methodology's ability to implement the competitive innovation patent theory. The heavy 
presumption methodology's claim scope paradigm does not tailor claim scope to the disclosed 
invention. In fact, it does the opposite. See supra Part IV.B.2. Such a methodology would score 
poorly in an evaluation in which the preferred claim scope is limited to the patentee's actual 
inventive activities. 
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scope paradigm is favored will fall in the positive part of the 
horizontal axis in either quadrant II or IV. 
Methodologies, therefore, become more favorable as they move 
into the upper right hand quadrant or quadrant II. Methodologies 
falling in quadrant II both increase certainty and have a claim scope 
paradigm that is at least somewhat successful in implementing the 
preferred patent scope. 
Use of both criteria can be quite successful and can ensure that 
a methodology maximizes both functions of patent claims-public 
notice and the substantive defining of claim scope. Moreover, 
nothing indicates that maximization of one benchmark is mutually 
exclusive of the other. The opposite may even be true; a positive 
relationship could exist between the two criteria. As a methodology 
comes closer to producing what is considered the proper claim scope, 
that methodology may necessarily produce a more predictable 
definition. At the least, taking both criteria into account ensures 
that both functions of the patent claim are being considered when 
adopting a method for interpreting them. 
2. Recognizing that the Claim Scope Paradigm Facilitates 
Using Claim Interpretation Methodology as a Highly Effective 
Patent Policy Lever 
The identification of a methodology's claim scope paradigm also 
facilitates the methodology's use as a patent policy lever. As Burk 
and Lemley recognized recently, the patent system gives courts con-
siderable discretion in implementing patent law.395 This discretion, 
in turn, allows courts to embed policy considerations in their patent 
decisions. 396 Burk and Lemley use the term "policy levers" to 
describe these areas of discretion that affect patent policy.397 They 
focus their patent policy lever discussion on using court discretion 
to create "industry-sensitive policy."398 Certain policy levers that 
they identify, such as the utility and written description require-
395. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1630, 1638-40. 
396. Id. 
397. See id. at 1630 (using the "policy lever'' terminology); see also Pamela Samuelson & 
Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 
1581 (2002) (discussing policy levers in the reverse engineering context, but with regard to 
specific industries and intellectual property generally). 
398. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1630. 
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ments, allow courts to shape patent law to have different impacts on 
different industries. 399 One potential policy lever Burk and Lemley 
do not discuss is claim interpretation methodology. 
Claim interpretation methodology possesses all of the attributes 
of a patent policy lever. Courts are given a wide range of discretion 
in formulating claim interpretation methodologies. Moreover, in 
using this discretion, courts have embedded claim scope paradigms 
into their methodologies.400 These paradigms directly affect the 
extent of patent protection. 401 By using its discretion, a court can use 
interpretation methodology as a ''lever" to implement specific patent 
policies by directly impacting claim scope. The available discretion, 
combined with the ability to affect patent scope, makes claim 
interpretation methodology eligible as a policy lever. 
Interpretation methodology is a highly effective policy lever. A 
methodology's claim scope paradigm imputes patent theory into the 
definitional process, as the defined claim's scope reflects the claim 
scope paradigm. Injecting patent policy at the analysis's interpreta-
tion stage introduces such policy at the patent process's most basic 
level. Claim interpretation is the first step in determining infringe-
ment and validity, the two major patent inquiries.402 Any policy 
introduced at the interpretation stage propagates throughout the 
patent analysis. The construed claim is used to determine which 
competitors a patentee can exclude or whether the patent is valid 
and enforceable against those competitors.403 The claim scope 
paradigm's view on proper claim scope shapes the complete patent 
analysis because claims are at the base of the analysis. If the policy 
lever needs to be moved, the interpretation methodology that is used 
can be changed simply. That change of claim scope paradigm at the 
interpretation level will then ripple throughout the patent process. 
Claim interpretation methodology can be contrasted with the 
policy levers currently under discussion. These levers mainly 
include various tests for determining the validity of the patent 
grant.404 They address, for example, whether the patented invention 
399. ld. at 1641-58 (detailing other existing policy levers). 
400. See supra Part IV.A. 
401. See supra Part IV.B. 
402. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text. 
403. See id. 
404. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1641-68. The policy levers that Burk and Lemley 
discuss as either currently in use or of potential use also include levers not related to validity 
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is obvious in light of the prior art or whether the patented invention 
is enabled sufficiently.405 The reason interpretation methodology is 
a better lever than these validity tests is timing; both of these 
known levers are triggered after the patent claims are inter-
preted.406 The claim scope paradigm has appeared already in the 
defined claim when these known levers are activated. Patent policy 
is set already, by the interpretation methodology chosen, before 
these recognized policy levers can take effect. Interpretation 
methodology also impacts infringement, the other major part of 
most patent questions.407 Few, if any, currently recognized patent 
policy levers address this part of the patent system. 408 Without 
recognizing claim interpretation as a policy lever, a base level policy 
tool will not be fully utilized and the potential frustration that it can 
cause other policy levers will go unnoticed. 
Two concerns exist with using claim interpretation methodology 
as a policy lever. The first focuses on the propriety of courts setting 
patent policy, particularly at such a low level, without any clear 
direction from Congress. If courts look to and compare claim scope 
paradigms, they are making substantive judgments about what is 
considered optimal patent protection. Such substantive decisions 
arguably should be made only by policymakers, who have access to 
complete information on the industry effects of patents, and not by 
courts, which only have information about the particular case 
before them. This objection to courts employing policy levers may be 
especially valid when dealing with claim interpretation. The court 
should focus solely on giving the claim language meaning at the 
claim construction stage, not making patent policy. If the courts 
engage in any policy analysis, it should come later in the patent 
process, where statutes constrain the extent to which court-
employed policy levers can swing. 
The fallacy with this concern is that courts are already making 
substantive judgments when choosing claim interpretation method-
questions. However, the majority of the levers are tied in some way to the patentability of the 
subject matter at issue. Id. 
405. Id. at 1651-54. 
406. See supra notes 71-79, 95-100. 
407. See supra notes 64-70, 100. 
408. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1641-68. For example, the policy levers of 
experimental use, id. at 1646-48, and reverse doctrine of equivalents, id. at 1657-58, are some 
of the few that concern questions of patent infringement. 
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ologies, regardless of propriety. No statutes exist that dictate how 
claims are interpreted, and claim interpretation methodologies 
include claim scope paradigms that embed patent theory in the 
resulting claim definitions. When courts are faced with choices 
between methodologies, they are also facing patent policy choices. 409 
For example, compare the majority and dissent in Microsoft. Both 
choose different methodologies, but they made this choice in the real 
context of whether Multi-Tech's patents will give them protection 
over voice and data transmissions on both telephone connections 
and the Internet.410 The methodology choice in Microsoft was 
intertwined with the question of how broad of a transmission 
system Multi-Tech should own exclusively. The same situation 
existed in SuperGuide, where a decision on proper methodology was 
tied to a decision on the proper claim scope, namely, whether to 
include digital television signals or not in the patentee's scope of 
protection. 411 Again, a methodology question and a question of a 
patent's im_ract on the satellite television industry become one and 
the same. The mere existence of a claim scope paradigm means that 
all decisions regarding methodologies are also decisions regarding 
patent policy. 
Courts will thus make policy decisions when they construe claims 
regardless of whether they openly recognize this fact and use 
methodology as a lever. One benefit of establishing claim scope 
paradigm as a criterion is that these policy decisions become 
transparent.412 Courts and observers will at least know the policy 
implications of selecting one methodology over the other. Further-
more, with the inevitability of patent policy becoming tied to 
interpretation methodology, courts might as well use methodology 
as a policy lever. If a certain methodology is producing a claim scope 
that the courts disfavor, the courts, can at a minimum, switch to a 
methodology with a more favorable claim scope paradigm. 
409. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1674 (noting how "[t]he Federal Circuit cannot 
avoid making policy judgments" when it uses its discretion). 
410. See Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc. 357 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004); id. 
at 1354-55 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
411. See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 872,877-79 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
412. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1673-75 (noting that by making these policy 
decisions transparent, courts are more likely to face the policy implications of their decisions 
and ensure that they are congruent with innovation policy); see also John R. Thomas, 
Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774 (2003). 
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The concern about methodology as a policy lever also underplays 
the ability of courts to make competent patent policy decisions. This 
is particularly apparent in the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit 
has an inherent expertise in the patent arena, considering that it 
exclusively handles all patent appeals.413 The court has a real insti-
tutional competence when it comes to patent law and policy,414 
which primarily stems from its interaction with nearly every patent 
case filed in the United States.415 The scientific and patent law 
background of some of the judges on the court also gives the court 
a significant degree of proficiency in the patent area. 416 No reason 
exists for the court not to use its knowledge and experience when 
selecting among methodologies and their claim scope paradigms. If 
such activity truly falls outside of the court's providence, Congress 
can always act and legislate a specific methodology that courts must 
use.417 
Another objection to using claim interpretation methodology as 
a policy lever is that such use will fuel game-playing problems by 
those drafting and obtaining patents.418 Patent prosecutors, who 
help individuals obtain patents, react to patent rules to maximize 
the protection they obtain for their clients. A feedback of sorts 
exists, wherein a patent rule is established and patent prosecutors 
react to the rule.419 Adopting a particular claim methodology will 
likely have ex ante effects. 420 Patent prosecutors will change the 
way that patent claims and specifications are drafted in order to 
413. See Cotropia, supra note 245, at 259-61; Dreyfuss, supra note 250, at 14-25 (assessing 
the effectiveness of the Federal Circuit in accomplishing the goals it was designed to achieve). 
414. See Dreyfuss, supra note 250, at 17-21. 
415. Id. 
416. See Rai, supra note 3, at 1068 (noting, however, that even this expertise is insufficient 
to give the court competence in factual issues). 
417. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1630-31 (noting how Congress has tailored patent 
legislation to particular industries). 
418. See Boalick, supra note 14 7, at 270-71 (noting the interaction between the dedication 
rule and patent drafting); R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering EstoppeL· Patent Administration and 
the Failure o[Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 242-43 (2002) (discussing the ex ante effects of 
prosecution history estoppel). 
419. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyu Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002); 
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (noting concern with how changes in patent rules affect the expectations of 
patentees during prosecution). 
420. See Boalick, supra note 147, at 270-71; Wagner, supra note 418, at 242-43. 
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maximize patent scope under the new claim construction rules.421 
Such a feedback potentially could neutralize a claim interpretation 
methodology's ability to act as a policy lever. For example, the 
specification methodology is chosen because it implements the 
competitive innovation theory, thereby limiting claim scope to the 
disclosed invention. Patent practitioners will likely react to this 
methodology's adoption by redrafting patent claims and the 
specification to maximize the resulting patent scope. Because of this 
feedback, patent scope could be larger than intended, thereby 
inhibiting the implementation of the competitive innovation theory 
because of the adjustments practitioners may make. 
The ability of this feedback loop to frustrate the interpretation 
methodology's ability to act as a policy lever is overstated. Real 
world limitations exist on the changes that patent prosecutors can 
make to the patent document. The disclosure rules in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 dictate the specifications' contents. Every patentee must 
set forth a written description of each's invention that is also 
enabling.422 In addition, the patentee must be the inventor of the 
claimed subject matter.423 The patent prosecutor is therefore 
constrained to some extent by the patentee's inventive activities. 
Also, not all reactions frustrate the policies that courts are trying to 
further. For example, consider the specific feedback described above. 
If the specification methodology's adoption causes patent prosecu-
tors to include more information in the specification in hopes of 
expanding what constitutes the disclosed invention, that reaction 
will not frustrate the competitive innovation theory. The resulting 
claim scope will still be tailored to the disclosed invention. The 
resulting scope of protection will still only give the patentee 
protection for her invention and the variations recognized by one 
skilled in the art. Finally, an equilibrium is reachable once a single 
methodology and claim scope paradigm is chosen. Practitioners only 
react when rules are changed or are unclear. Courts may change 
their rules in reaction to the changes practitioners make, but, in 
each feedback step, the amount of change from the previous state 
421. Wagner, supra note 418, at 242-43. 
422. See supra Part II.B.l. 
423. See 35 U.S.C. § 115, § 102(f) (2000); Pannu v. lolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1348-49 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (noting that a patent is invalid if the named inventor did not invent the claimed 
invention). 
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will be smaller and the action-reaction cycle will eventually come to 
rest. 
CONCLUSION 
Claim interpretation involves more than simply trying to 
determine the meaning of claim terms. Claim interpretation 
includes choices among available patent scopes. These choices are 
made by selecting a particular claim interpretation methodology. 
The way claims are defined directly affects the resulting literal 
claim scope, and thus, the extent of the power that the patentee can 
exert on a given industry. This effect on claim scope is a methodol-
ogy's claim scope paradigm. The current debate regarding claim 
interpretation fails to fully recognize the relationship between claim 
interpretation methodology and patent scope. The recent Phillips III 
decision is a step in the right direction, showing some appreciation 
by the Federal Circuit for the relationship between methodology and 
claim scope. However, the court and commentators still fail to gain 
the full benefit from identifying a methodology's claim scope 
paradigm and then recognizing the impact the methodology has on 
patent policy. Such recognition will facilitate courts to use methodol-
ogies as a highly effective patent policy lever. 

